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31 Introduction
For much of the past two decades, Turkey’s economy has suﬀered from per-
sistent ﬁscal imbalances, high inﬂation, ﬁnancial volatility, and sharp swings
in economic activity (see Figure 1). Large budget deﬁcits during the 1990s
fueled a rapid expansion in domestic public debt and sharp increases in real
interest rates, with deposit rates for instance averaging 12.8 percent during
that decade. In turn, high interest rates had an adverse eﬀect on private
investment and contributed to unsustainable debt dynamics. The overall
balance of the consolidated public sector rose from 5.2 percent of GNP to
13.1 percent in 1997 and 22.3 percent in 1999. The net debt of the public
sector reached 61 percent in 1999.1 In late 1999, the government launched
a 3-year disinﬂation program based on a pre-announced exchange rate path.
Despite some progress in 2000, with inﬂation falling and the public sector
recording a sizable primary surplus, unfavorable debt dynamics and ﬁnancial
sector weaknesses combined with the rigidities imposed by the exchange rate
p e gl e dt oac u r r e n c yc o l l a p s ea n daf u l l - b l o w nﬁnancial crisis.2 Between the
end of 1995 and the end of 2001, Turkey’s public debt almost doubled in
proportion to GNP, from 41.3 percent to 80 percent (see Figure 1) with a
signiﬁcant portion of the increase coming in 2001 as the cost of bank restruc-
turing was borne by the budget. Inﬂation hit 68.5 percent at the end of 2001
and the nominal interest rate on treasury bills reached 99.1 percent.
Although short-lived (the economy started to recover in 2002), the crisis
had severe economic and social costs. Real GNP fell by 9.5 percent in 2001
alone, whereas per capita GDP contracted by 13 percent between 1998 and
2001. The oﬃcially recorded unemployment rate rose from 6.4 percent in
1998 to 8.5 percent in 2001 and 10.6 percent during 2002 (see Figure 2).
Real wages in manufacturing remained relatively constant throughout 2000
as nominal wage increases kept pace with inﬂation, but then declined sharply
in 2001–by 20 percent in the fourth quarter of that year, compared to the
1In 1995, foreign debt represented two thirds of total debt (or 30.7 percent of GNP),
whereas in 2002 it amounted to 40 percent of the stock (or 32.1 percent of GNP). Moreover,
a sizeable fraction of the domestic debt is now denominated in foreign currency or indexed
on the exchange rate. In 2002 this debt amounted to 15.3 percent of GNP, with total
domestic debt representing 47.7 percent. The sum of foreign debt and foreign-currency
denominated domestic debt amounted therefore to 47.4 percent that same year.
2See Yilmaz and Boratav (2003) for an overview of developments leading up to the
crisis.
4same period of the previous year (World Bank (2003)).World Bank estimates
indicate that the urban headcount poverty index rose from 6.2 percent in
1994 to 17.2 percent in 2001. Credit to the private sector (particularly in
the nontradables sector) fell sharply as a share of GDP and recovered only
slowly–a typical pattern in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises in developing
countries, as documented for instance by Tornell and Westermann (2003)
and Schneider and Tornell (2004).
The development of the public debt overhang and the consequent need for
continuous reﬁnancing of the debt has led to a very close link between ﬁnan-
cial market participants’ perceptions of credibility of the Government’s pro-
gram, key macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, exchange rates and
inﬂation, and real variables such as employment and growth. Our premise
in this paper is that a proper modeling of the structure of the labor mar-
ket in Turkey, and a proper account of the linkages between the ﬁnancial
and real sides of the Turkish economy, are essential steps to understand the
impact of the disinﬂation program on the evolution of output and employ-
ment. Accordingly, we develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model with a relatively aggregated productive sector, a segmented
labor market and a full-blown ﬁnancial sector.3 By itself, this endeavour is
not new; over the years, a number of CGE models have been developed for
Turkey. These include Lewis (1992), Yeldan (1997, 1998), Diao, Roe, and
Yeldan (1998), Karadag and Westaway (1999), De Santis (2000), Voyvoda
and Yeldan (2003), and Elekdag (2003). Those of Lewis (1992), Yeldan
(1998), and Elekdag (2003) include a ﬁnancial sector, whereas the others are
“real” models focusing on tax and trade policy issues. In all of these models,
however, the treatment of the labor market is fairly rudimentary and some
important channels through which the real and ﬁnancial sectors interact are
absent. Indeed, as far as we are aware, some of these channels have been
either ignored or improperly addressed in the previous literature; our frame-
work should therefore be of independent interest to researchers focusing on
other countries with large market-ﬁnanced debt overhangs.
We pay particular attention to ﬁnancial sector issues such as a high degree
of exchange rate ﬂexibility, risk premia in the banking sector, dollarization of
3T h em o d e ld e v e l o p e di nt h i sp a p e ri sb a s e do nt h eI M M P A( f o rI n t e g r a t e dM a c r o -
economic Model for Poverty Analysis) framework developed by Agénor (2003a), Agénor,
Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003), and Agénor, Fernandes, Haddad, and Jensen (2003). This
c l a s so fm o d e l sc a p t u r e sr e a la n dﬁnancial features that are common to many developing
countries.
5loans and bank deposits, the link between market interest rates and oﬃcial
policy rates, and interactions between credibility, default risk on government
debt, and inﬂation expectations. Understanding the link between credibility
and inﬂation, in particular, is important to understand Turkey’s experience
in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 ﬁnancial crisis. For instance, to the
extent that inﬂation inertia is due to doubts about the commitment and
ability of policymakers to keep prices in check, a disinﬂation program may
entail a large output cost.
Accounting for default risk on public debt is another key feature of our
analysis. It is well recognized that ﬁs c a lp o l i c ym u s tb ee v a l u a t e di naf r a m e -
work in which the government is subject to an intertemporal budget con-
straint (see, for instance, Uctum and Wickens (2000), Gunaydin (2003), and
Salman (2003) for a discussion in Turkey’s context). If the real rate of in-
terest is above the real growth rate of the economy, a ﬁscal deﬁcit today
(brought about by either an increase in expenditure or a reduction in taxes)
m u s tb ea c c o m p a n i e da ts o m ep o i n ti nt h ef u t u r eb ye i t h e raﬁscal contrac-
tion or a rise in seigniorage revenue. Otherwise, the increase in public debt
will feed upon itself as the government borrows to ﬁnance the interest pay-
ments on the liabilities that it previously issued. If the government cannot
meet its debt service payments without further borrowing, investors may be
unwilling after a certain point to continue to accumulate government bonds.
As a result, the government will have to either reduce its primary deﬁcit or
engage in an outright default. Although we do not account explicitly for the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint in our framework, we capture
this “unwillingness” of investors to provide indeﬁnite ﬁnancing by assuming
that there is a non-zero probability of default that depends on the existing
stock of debt. In turn, the probability of default aﬀects the expected rate of
return on government bonds. The higher the perceived risk of default is, the
higher will be the actual interest rate on these bonds, and the lower will be
t h ed e g r e eo fc r e d i b i l i t yo ft h eﬁscal stance. Lower credibility translates into
higher inﬂation expectations and greater inﬂation persistence.4
4Diao, Roe, and Yeldan (1998) analyzed ﬁscal management issues in Turkey using an
explicit intertemporal CGE framework that accounts for the existence of a risk premium
associated with large public sector borrowing requirements. Speciﬁcally, the domestic real
interest rate, r, is taken to diverge from the world interest r∗,b yr =( 1+θ)r∗,w i t hθ
b e i n gaf u n c t i o no ft h er a t i oo ft h eﬁscal deﬁcit to GDP. However, the model is “real”
and thus the impact of interest rate changes on portfolio decisions and the supply side
(through short-term bank borrowing) are not taken into account.
6Given our focus on the behavior of wages and unemployment during dis-
inﬂation, the labor market plays also an important role in our analysis. In-
deed, our framework captures many important features of the Turkish labor
market–namely, a large informal urban economy, open unskilled urban un-
employment, wage bargaining in the urban formal sector, and international
migration, with remittance ﬂows accounting for about 2 percent of GDP in
2002. In any model designed to study the response of the labor market to
short-run macro shocks and structural adjustment measures, accounting for
the informal sector is essential; in the case of Turkey, it is even more so. Some
observers have argued that growth in that sector may explain the observed
tendency for labor force participation to fall since the 1960s, that is, the
growing gap between the labor force (the adult population either employed
or looking for work, which was 22 million in 2001) and the adult population
(of about 46 million adults in that same year).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the model. Section III considers two policy experiments and discusses the
response of production, wages and unemployment, as well as the behavior of
the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The ﬁrst consists of a temporary increase in
oﬃcial interest rates. The second focuses on ﬁscal adjustment and involves
tax reform, namely an increase in the VAT rate and a rise in the tax rate
on income of proﬁt earners. These simulations are important because the
sustainability of Turkey’s public debt remains a key policy issue. It has been
argued by various observers that Turkey needs to run large primary surpluses
over the medium and long term to lower its public debt burden, meet its dis-
inﬂation targets, and convince markets that its debt is sustainable, for the
risk premium embedded in interest rates on domestic debt to fall. The ad-
justment program introduced in May 2001 called for Turkey to maintain a
primary surplus on the order of 6.5 percent of GNP over the medium term to
lower its public debt to manageable proportions and achieve the goal of single
digit inﬂation by 2005.5 Although we do not assess explicitly the validity of
this target, our simulations allow us to quantify the impact of ﬁscal adjust-
ment not only on the budget and domestic inﬂation, but also on the labor
market (real wages and unemployment) and standards of living. The last
5These estimates are based on a variant of the consistency framework developed by
Anand and van Wijnbergen (1989). This approach lacks a simultaenous determination of
the rate of output growth, the real interest rate, ﬁscal variables, and the real exchange
rate. Our analysis, by constrast, is cast in a general equilibrium setting, as in Voyvoda
and Yeldan (2003).
7section summarizes the main results of the paper and oﬀers some concluding
remarks. Appendices A and B provide a list of equations and variable deﬁni-
tions, whereas Appendix C discusses the structure of the ﬁnancial SAM that
underlies the model, our calibration procedure, and the parameter values
that are used in the behavioral equations.
2 Structure of the Model
Our model of the Turkish economy captures three features that we believe
are essential to analyze the impact of disinﬂation and ﬁscal reforms on labor
market adjustment and public debt sustainability. First, the linkages between
the ﬁnancial and the real sectors; second, the structure of the labor market;
and third, the channels through which ﬁscal variables interact with ﬁnancial
variables to aﬀect the economy. In addition, particular attention is paid to
modeling monetary policy and the credit market. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the central bank sets a short-term policy interest rate (such as the repurchase
rate) and has a perfectly elastic supply curve of liquidity to commercial banks
at that rate. Credit to ﬁrms by commercial banks is also perfectly elastic (at
the given lending rate), whereas lending to households is subject to rationing.
Foreign borrowing by commercial banks is exogenous and equilibrium of the
credit market is obtained by domestic borrowing from the central bank, at
the given policy rate.
In this section we review the various building blocks of the model. We
consider in turn the production side, the labor market, external trade, ag-
gregate supply and demand, income formation, saving and investment, the
ﬁnancial sector and asset allocation decisions, the balance sheets and ﬂow
budget constraints of the public sector (comprising both the government and
the central bank), the balance of payments, equilibrium conditions for the
currency and bond markets, price formation, and the links between default
risk, credibility, and inﬂation expectations.
2.1 Production
Given our focus on macroeconomic aspects, the production structure is kept
fairly aggregate. The economy is divided between rural and urban sectors.
The rural sector produces a homogeneous good, which is sold domestically
and abroad. The urban sector consists of both formal and informal compo-
8nents; furthermore, the formal urban economy is separated between a private
sector (which also produces a good sold on both domestic and foreign mar-
kets) and a public sector, which produces a single nontraded good.
2.1.1 Rural Sector
Gross output in the rural sector, XA, is given by the sum of value added, VA,
and intermediate consumption:




where the aij are input-output coeﬃcients measuring sales from sector i to
sector j.W ea l s oh a v ei,j = A,I,P,G where A, I, P, G are used in what
follows to refer, unless otherwise indicated, to the rural sector, the urban
informal sector, the private urban formal sector, and the public sector, re-
spectively.
Value added is produced with land, LAND (available in ﬁxed supply),
unskilled labor, UA (the only category of labor in the rural sector), and the
economy-wide stock of public capital in infrastructure, KINF, which is treated
as a pure public good and consists not only of roads and public transportation
that may increase access to markets, but also power plants, hospitals, and
other public goods that may contribute to an increase in the productivity of
factors in private production. A two-level production structure is assumed.
Speciﬁcally, UA and KINF combine through a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) function to form a composite factor, which is then combined













Thus, given the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, rural production exhibits
decreasing returns to scale in the composite input. In what follows, the
quantity of land is normalized to unity.
In standard fashion, output of the rural sector is allocated to domestic









where, as discussed later, the ratio EA/DA depends on relative prices.
92.1.2 Urban Informal Sector
T h es e c o n dc o m p o n e n to ft h ep r o d u c t i o ns t r u c t u r ei st h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o r ,
whose share increased signiﬁcantly in Turkey since the 1980s. The OECD
(1996) estimated the size of the non-agricultural informal sector (deﬁned as
unpaid family workers, half of the self-employed, employers with fewer than
four employees, and unregistered wage earners) to be 21 percent for 1993.
Another study (cited by Onaran (2002)) using the same deﬁnition found 23
percent for 1997. The private formal sector was estimated at 19 percent
of total employment, the public sector at 12 percent, with the rest (about
46 percent of total employment) being employed in the agricultural sector.
Thus, the informal non-agricultural sector exceeded the size of the private
formal sector. More recently, Taymaz and Ozler (2003) estimated that the
informal sector accounts for more than 30 percent of output and 40 percent
of employment in the manufacturing sector. Similar estimates are cited in
Tunali (2003).
Gross production in the informal sector, XI, is given as the sum of value
added, VI, and intermediate consumption:




There is no physical capital in the informal sector, and value added is




I ,α XI > 0, 0 <β XI < 1, (5)







with WI denoting the nominal wage and PVI the price of value added.
2.1.3 Urban Formal Private Sector
Gross production in the private urban formal sector, XP, is again given by
t h es u mo fv a l u ea d d e d ,VP, and intermediate consumption:




10Value added is generated by combining both skilled and unskilled labor,
as well as public and private physical capital, through a multi-level CES
production structure. At the lowest level of factor combination, skilled labor,
SP, and private physical capital, KP, are combined to form the composite
input J1, with a relatively low elasticity of substitution (as measured by
σXP1 =1 /(1 + ρX31)) between them:
J1(SP,K P)=αXP1[βXP1S
−ρXP 1





At the second level, this composite input is used together with unskilled
labor, UP, to form the composite input J2:
J2(J1,U P)=αXP2{βXP2J
−ρXP 2






In line with the evidence for middle-income developing countries (see
Agénor (1996, 2003)), the elasticity of substitution between J1 and unskilled
labor, measured by σXP2 =1 /(1 + ρXP2), is taken to be higher than the
elasticity between SP and KP,t h a ti s
σXP2 >σ XP1.
The ﬁnal layer combines J2 and KINF (the stock of government capital










As in the rural sector, ﬁrms in the private urban formal sector allocate









This speciﬁcation also implies, as shown later, that the ratio EP/DP
depends on relative prices.
6An alternative approach would be to follow Stokey (1996) and assume that physical
capital (possibly deﬁned as a composite of both public and private capital) and unskilled
labor are substitutes, whereas both are complementary to skilled labor.
112.1.4 Public Production
Gross production of public services, XG, is given by the sum of value added,
VG, and intermediate consumption:




Value added is generated by combining both categories of labor and pub-
lic capital in infrastructure. Again, a two-level CES production structure is
assumed. At the ﬁrst level, skilled labor, SG, and public capital in infrastruc-
ture, KINF, combine to produce a composite input, JG, with a relatively low
elasticity of substitution between them:
JG(SG,K INF)=αXGJ[βXGJS
−ρXP J
















We assume that the elasticity of substitution between SG and KINF,
σXGJ =1 /(1+ρXGJ), is lower than the elasticity of substitution between the
composite input JG and UG, σXG =1 /(1+ρXG), in order to capture the fact
that there is a greater degree of complementarity between physical capital
and skilled labor (as in the private sector), and a greater substitutability
between these two factors and unskilled labor:
σXG >σ XGJ.
2.2 The Labor Market
As noted earlier, modeling the main features of the labor market in Turkey
is one of the key objectives of our model. Accounting for labor regulations
and government-induced sources of labor market segmentation are thus im-
portant. Turkey’s labor laws are the strictest in the OECD in terms of
employment protection; the country’s severance pay requirements are higher
than in any other country (except Portugal) and restrictions on the use of
12temporary workers are severe.7 In principle, employment protection rules
are meant to enhance job security by making dismissals costly to the em-
ployer. They should therefore help to stabilize employment levels, all else
being equal, reducing layoﬀs in downturns. But they also reduce hiring as
the economy recovers. The evidence for Turkey (see Tunali (2003)) suggests
that employment protection laws may have increased the insecurity faced by
workers, as employers avoid paying severance altogether and hire short-term
workers illegally, and may have shifted activity to the informal sector–with
adverse eﬀects on tax revenue.
Turkey has implemented a minimum wage law nationwide since 1974.
The minimum wage has been adjusted twice a year since 1999 to inﬂation.
During the period 2000-2001, it represented only about 25 percent of the
average daily wage in manufacturing (see Tunali (2003)). The extent to
which it is enforced, even in the urban formal sector, remains a matter of
debate. However, even if it is not “binding” per se, changes in the minimum
wage may well play an important signaling role for wage setters in general,
including trade unions. Similarly, it is widely believed that public sector
wages have a strong signaling eﬀect on wage setting in the private sector
(see Tunali (2003)). Collective agreements between the government and the
major trade unions–almost all civil servants and employees of state-owned
enterprises are unionized–serve as a model for unions and workers in the
formal private sector.8
I nm o d e l i n gt h el a b o rm a r k e tw ea t t e m p tt oc a p t u r ei nas t y l i z e dw a y
several of these features. Given that the model integrates an informal urban
sector, we account for the fact that labor market regulations and other “dis-
tortions” in the formal economy may not be binding for a large segment of
the labor market. Wages may therefore exhibit a high degree of ﬂexibility.
In light of the evidence suggesting that the power of trade unions has eroded
signiﬁcantly during the past two decades (see Onaran (2002)), we focus on
the case where workers in the private formal sector negotiate wages directly
7As demonstrated formally by Saint-Paul (2002), employment protection is more likely
to arise in economies with greater worker bargaining power.
8Tunali (2003) reports that the pair-wise correlation between average wages in the
public sector and the private manufacturing sector was 0.46 in the ﬁrst period and 0.78
in the second period. Note that Granger causality tests or impulse response functions
from simple VAR models (involving, for instance, the rates of growth of public and private
sector wages, inﬂation, and the cyclical component of output) could provide some useful
additional information.
13with ﬁrms. We also assume that workers’ reservation wage depends on wages
in the public sector. We thus capture the “signaling” eﬀect alluded to above.9
2.2.1 Rural Wages, Employment, and Migration
Unskilled workers in the economy may be employed either in the rural sector
or in the urban sector, whereas skilled workers are employed only in the
urban economy. We also assume that skilled workers who are unable to ﬁnd
a job in the formal sector do not opt to work in the informal economy, either
because of a high perceived disutility of work there, or because they fear an
adverse signaling eﬀect on future employers.
Assuming proﬁt maximization, and using the production function (2), the

























where WA denotes the nominal wage and PVA the net output price in the
rural sector.
Wages in the rural sector adjust to clear the labor market. Let Us
RUR









Over time, labor supply in the rural sector grows at an exogenous rate,
gRUR, net of worker migration to urban areas, MIG:
U
s
RUR = URUR,−1(1 + gRUR) − MIG. (17)
In the tradition of Harris and Todaro (1970), we assume that the incen-
tives to migrate depend negatively on the ratio of the average expected wage
in the rural sector to that prevailing in the urban sector. Unskilled workers
in the urban economy may be employed either in the private formal sector,
in which case they are paid a wage WUP,o rt h e yc a ne n t e rt h ei n f o r m a l
9As noted earlier, severance payments have long been a major source of frictions be-
tween unions and employers in Turkey. We do not explicitly introduce ﬁring costs given
the focus of our simulations in this paper; but this could be done along the lines suggested
by Agénor (2003).
14economy and receive the going wage in that sector, WI.10 Assuming that
unskilled workers in the private formal sector pay a social security tax at the
rate sstaxU, the expected unskilled urban wage, EWURB,i st h u saw e i g h t e d
average of (1 − sstaxU)WUP and WI:
EWURB = θU(1 − sstaxU)WUP,−1 +( 1− θU)WI,−1, (18)
where θU is the probability of ﬁnding a job in the private urban formal sec-
tor, which is approximated by the proportion of unskilled workers actually
employed in the private formal sector, UP, relative to the total number of
unskilled urban workers looking for a job, Us
F,m i n u st h o s ee m p l o y e di ng o v -






In the rural sector, the employment probability is equal to unity, because
workers can always ﬁnd a job at the going wage. Assuming a one-period lag,
the expected rural wage is thus WA,−1.












where 0 <λ M < 1 measures the speed of adjustment and σM > 0 measures
the elasticity of migration ﬂows with respect to expected wages. This speci-
ﬁcation assumes that costs associated with migration or other frictions may
delay the migration process, introducing persistence in migration ﬂows. Of
course, other factors can be relevant in explaining these ﬂows in Turkey. It
has been argued, for instance, that the dramatic reductions in government
subsidies to farming that started in the mid-1990s have made agriculture and
the rural sector less and less attractive, encouraging rural-to-urban migration
(see Tunali (2003)).11 This could be captured by deﬁning subsidies as neg-
ative production taxes–which would raise value added prices (as discussed
later) and aﬀect rural wages, through the labor demand function (15) and
the market equilibrium condition (16)).
10As noted later, there is no job turnover for either category of workers in the public
sector; the employment probability in that sector is therefore zero. Public sector wages
therefore do not aﬀect the expected urban wage.
11Further reductions in subsidies to farming in agriculture may therefore continue to
induce migration. Although this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it has important
implications for the design of ﬁscal adjustment.
152.2.2 The Urban Labor Market
In the urban sector, as noted earlier, both public and private production re-
quire skilled and unskilled labor, whereas production in the informal urban
sector requires only unskilled labor. We consider, in turn, the determina-
tion of wages and employment for both categories of labor, and then the
determination of wages through bargaining.
Public Employment and Wage Formation Both skilled and unskilled
employment in the public sector, UG and ST
G, respectively, are considered ex-
ogenous.12 Wages of both categories or workers, WUG and WSG, are assumed
to be fully indexed on the urban consumption price index, PURB:
WjG = ωjGPURB,j = U,S, (21)
where ωjG is an exogenous real base wage.13
Private Sector Wage Formation To determine the skilled and unskilled
wage rates in the private formal sector, WUP and WSP, we assume direct
bargaining between workers and employers over the nominal wage, as in
Agénor (2003). Consider ﬁrst the case of skilled workers. If a bargain is
reached, each worker receives WSP, whereas the producer receives PJ1mS −
WE
SP,w h e r eWE
SP is the eﬀective cost of labor, deﬁned as
W
E
SP =( 1+IL)(1 + paytaxS)WSP,
where IL is the bank lending rate on domestic-currency loans, paytaxS the
payroll tax rate on skilled labor, and mS = ∂J1(SP,K P)/∂SP the physical











12A good theory of what determines the share of public employment in Turkey (as in
many other developing countries) would involve considerations that are well beyond the
scope of this paper.
13To avoid a corner solution in which no worker wants to seek employment in the public
sector, we assume that working for the government provides a nonpecuniary beneﬁt( p e r -
haps in terms of higher job security or reduced volatility of earnings) that is suﬃciently
large to ensure that the diﬀerential between WjG and WjP,w i t hj = U,S,i sp o s i t i v e .







1−νS, 0 <ν S < 1,
where ΩS is the worker’s reservation wage and PJ1mS − WE
SP the ﬁrm’s
bargaining surplus. νS measures the bargaining strength of a skilled worker
relative to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst-order condition is given by
νS(





(1 − νS)(1 + IL)
(1 + paytaxS)−1 (










− (1 − νS)(1 + IL)(1 + paytaxS)=0 .
From this equation, and given the deﬁnition of WE
SP, the (equilibrium)
negotiated wage can be derived as
WSP =( 1− νS)ΩS +
νSPJ1mS
(1 + IL)(1 + paytaxS)
, (23)
which shows that the product wage is a weighted average of the reservation
wage, ΩS, and the marginal product of labor adjusted for the cost of borrow-
ing and payroll taxes. An increase in the cost of borrowing, or in the payroll
tax rate, lowers the equilibrium wage.
We also assume that the worker’s reservation wage, ΩS, is related posi-
tively to wages in the public sector, WSG, and the expected level of prices in
the urban sector, (measured by the quantity PURB,−1(1 + EINFL),w h e r e
EINFL is the expected inﬂation rate), and negatively to the skilled un-
employment rate, UNEMPS.14 Wage-setting in the public sector is thus
assumed to play a signaling role to wage setters in the rest of the economy,
as discussed earlier. Given the exogeneity of public sector employment (which
therefore cannot represent a job opportunity for those seeking employment),
14Note that the reservation wage could be made a function of the unemployment beneﬁt
rate as well. However, an unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in Turkey only
in August 1999; premium collections started in June 2000 and the ﬁrst payments were
made in March 2002. There is no evidence so far that these beneﬁts have started to aﬀect
wage formation.
17this signaling role may be the result of “fairness” considerations, rather than
the perception of broader employment options.
The introduction of expected prices in the urban sector measures the ex-
tent to which the worker’s reservation wage is driven by the desire to maintain
its real purchasing power. To the extent that expectations of inﬂation dis-
play persistence (as a result of low credibility, itself resulting perhaps from
a higher risk of default on public debt, as discussed later), real wage inertia
may result. When unemployment is high, the probability of ﬁn d i n gaj o b( a t
any given wage) is low. Consequently, the higher the unemployment rate, the













where ΩS0 > 0 and the φ
k
S coeﬃcients, with k =1 ,2,3, are all positive.
Equations (23) and (24) indicate that lower unemployment, higher public
sector wages, and higher expected inﬂation raise the level of skilled wages
in the private sector. The link between the levels of unemployment and
private sector wages is consistent with the “wage curve” predicted by various
eﬃciency wage models, and has received partial support in the empirical
literature on labor markets in Turkey (see Ilkkaracan and Selim (2002)). This
speciﬁcation diﬀers signiﬁcantly from Phillips-curve type of wage equations,
in which unemployment aﬀects the rate of growth of nominal wages. To
the extent that the expected inﬂation rate depends on past inﬂation (as
documented in various studies on Turkey, such as Agénor (2002), Agénor and
Bayraktar (2003), and Lim and Papi (1997)), our speciﬁcation may generate
some signiﬁcant degree of real wage rigidity. And depending on the structure
of the coeﬃcients φ
k
S, a variety of alternative speciﬁcations of the behavior
of skilled and unskilled wages can be obtained. For instance, to impose
the assumption that the target wage for skilled workers is fully indexed on








To determine unskilled wages in the private formal sector, we also assume
that workers are engaged in individual bargaining with ﬁrms. Following the
same reasoning as above, the wage-setting equation is thus
WUP =( 1− νU)ΩU +
νUPJ2mU
(1 + IL)(1 + paytaxU)
, (25)
18where paytaxU is the payroll tax rate on unskilled labor, 0 <ν U < 1 measures


























Equation (27) has the same structure as (24), with UNEMPU denoting
the unskilled open unemployment rate, except for an additional term in WM,
the legally-set unskilled minimum wage. This speciﬁcation aims to capture
the signaling role that changes in the minimum wage may have on wage-
setting in the private sector. Thus, the minimum wage is implicitly assumed
to be non-binding; it cou l db em a d es ob ys e t t i n gφ
k
U =0 ,f o rk =1 ,2,3
φ
4
U = ΩU0 =1 ,a n dνU =0 .
Private Sector Employment, Labor Supply, and Skills Formation
The demand for unskilled labor by ﬁrms in the formal private sector is de-
termined by ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization subject to the wage set through bar-
gaining with workers, WUP, as determined above. These ﬁrms have access
only to bank credit to ﬁnance their working capital needs. Speciﬁcally, they
borrow to ﬁnance their wage bill (inclusive of payroll taxes) prior to the sale
of output. Moreover, we assume that banks can borrow only in domestic
currency to ﬁnance working capital needs, unlike borrowing for capital accu-
mulation, which (as discussed later) can be done in either domestic or foreign
currency. As a result, the eﬀective price of labor includes the bank lending
rate on domestic-currency loans, IL.
We assume also that ﬁrms pay a payroll tax, at the rate 0 <p a y t a x U < 1
for unskilled workers, which is proportional to the wage bill, WUPUP.15 The
demand for unskilled labor by (and actual unskilled employment in) the















15In Turkey, payroll taxes are paid both by employees (in the form of social security
contributions) and employers; see Tunali (2003). We capture employee contributions in
our deﬁnition of “take home” pay.
19As in Agénor (2005a), mobility of the unskilled labor force between the
formal and informal sectors is imperfect. Implicit in this assumption is the
idea that the labor market in Turkey is characterized by the absence (or poor
functioning) of institutions capable of processing and providing in a timely
manner relevant information on job opportunities to potential applicants–
particularly those with low levels of qualiﬁcations. As a result, low-skilled
workers employed in the informal sector are unable to engage in on-the-job
search. Looking for a job in the formal sector for that category of workers
requires, literally, being physically present at the doors of potential employ-
ers.
Formally, migration ﬂows between the formal and informal sectors are
assumed to be determined (as for rural-urban migration) by expected income
opportunities. Following a similar reasoning as before, the supply of unskilled






















where βF > 0 denotes the speed of adjustment and Ud
P,−1/(Us
F,−1 − UG,−1)
measures the probability of being hired in the private sector, approximated by
the ratio of employed workers to those seeking employment (with a one-period
lag). Note that expected income in the private formal sector is measured net
of social security taxes, as in (18)).








The supply of labor in the informal economy, Us
I, is obtained by subtract-









The informal labor market clears continuously, so that Ud
I = Us
I.F r o m






16To ensure that unskilled urban workers will always seek employment in the private
formal sector ﬁrst, we assume throughout that WI <W UP.
20The urban unskilled labor supply, Us
URB, increases as a result of exogenous
growth (at the rate gURB), and rural-to-urban migration, net of “outﬂows”





URB,−1(1 + gURB)+MIG− SKL− IMIG. (33)
As noted earlier, private urban ﬁrms pay a payroll tax, at the rate 0 <
paytaxS < 1, on their skilled wage bill, WSSP. From (8), the demand for















As noted earlier, skilled workers who are unable to ﬁnd a job in the formal
economy opt to remain openly unemployed, instead of entering the informal
economy. The rate of skilled unemployment, UNEMPS,i st h u sg i v e nb yt h e
ratio of skilled workers who are not employed either by the private or the








G is total skilled employment in the public sector, deﬁned as
S
T




G denoting the exogenous number of skilled workers involved in pro-
viding education.
The acquisition of skills by unskilled workers takes place through an ed-
ucation system operated (free of charge) by the public sector.17 Speciﬁcally,
the ﬂow of unskilled workers who become skilled, SKL,i st a k e nt ob ea
CES function of the number of skilled workers (teachers) in the public sector
engaged in providing education, SE









17Note that we abstract from the cost of acquiring skills (as measured by the number of
years of schooling multiplied by the average cost of education per year), which should also
aﬀect the propensity to invest in skills acquisition. We also do not account from privately-
provided education. During the 1980s and 1990s, several new private universities were
founded in Turkey. However, they still account for only a small fraction of the graduates
produced by the higher education system as a whole.
21The evolution of the skilled labor force depends on the rate at which
unskilled workers acquire skills:
S =( 1− δS)S−1 + SKL, (38)
where 0 <δ S < 1 is the rate of “depreciation” of the skilled labor force.
2.2.3 International Labor Migration
In line with the evidence on international migration ﬂows in Turkey, we as-
sume that migrants are essentially unskilled workers, and that all potential
migrants are in the urban sector (as captured in (33)). Moreover, interna-
tional migration ﬂows are taken to be determined by the expected urban
wage for unskilled labor, EWURB, given by (18), relative to the foreign wage
measured in domestic-currency terms, EWF. Assuming a one-period lag, we
have
EWF = ER−1 · WF,−1,
with WF denoting the foreign wage measured in foreign-currency terms,
which is assumed exogenous. Adopting a speciﬁcation similar to (20), the













where 0 <λ IM < 1 measures the speed of adjustment, and σIM > 0 the par-
tial elasticity of migration ﬂows with respect to expected wages. Because the
employment probability aﬀects the expected domestic wage, the prevailing
unskilled unemployment rate in the formal urban sector aﬀects indirectly the
decision to migrate. Again, costs associated with migration (such as reloca-
tion costs) are assumed to introduce some degree of persistence. As discussed
later, remittances associated with international migration ﬂows of unskilled
labor are assumed to beneﬁt unskilled households in the urban formal and
informal sectors.
2.3 Export Supply and Import Demand
Given the CET functions (3) and (11), the eﬃcient allocation of production
between domestic sales and exports in the rural and private urban formal
22sectors yields export supply equations that depend on the price of exports










,i = A,P. (40)
Imports in both of these sectors compete with domestic goods. In the
Armington tradition, both categories of goods are combined through CES










ρQi ,i = A,P. (41)
Assuming cost minimization, import demand for both sectors, MA and









,i = A,P, (42)
where PM i is the domestic price of imports (inclusive of tariﬀs) and σQi =
1/(1 + ρQi) the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported
goods.
2.4 Aggregate Supply and Demand
As noted earlier (see equation (41)), supply of rural and private urban for-
mal sector goods consists of composite goods, which combine imports and
domestically produced goods. Both the informal and public sector goods are




i = Xi,i = I,G. (43)
Aggregate demand in the rural and informal sectors, Qd
A and Qd
I,c o n s i s t s
of intermediate consumption and demand for ﬁnal consumption–by both the
government and households for the former, CA and GA, and by households
only in the latter, CI (the government does not spend on informal sector
goods). Aggregate demand for the public and private goods, Qd
G and Qd
P,
consists not only of intermediate consumption and ﬁnal consumption, but
23also of investment demand by private ﬁrms in the urban formal sector, ZG
P
and ZP
P , and the government, ZG:
Q
d
A = CA + GA + INTA, (44)
Q
d
I = CI + INTI, (45)
Q
d
G = CG + GG + Z
G
P + INTG, (46)
Q
d
P = CP + GP + Z
P
P + ZG + INTP, (47)
where INTj is deﬁned as total demand (by all i productions sectors) for





Total real government consumption of goods and services, G, is allocated




, for i = A,P,G, (49)
where PG is the government consumption deﬂator, and PC i the sales price
of good i,a n d
P
i ggi =1 .
Private ﬁnal consumption for each production sector i, Ci,i st h es u m -
mation across all categories of households of nominal consumption of good














where Cih is consumption of good i by household h, xih is the autonomous
level of consumption of good i by household h,a n dCONh total nominal
consumption expenditure by household h. Equations (50) are based on the
linear expenditure system. Coeﬃcients ccih indicate how total consumption
expenditure by household h is allocated to each type of good. They satisfy
the usual restrictions, 0 <c c ih < 1 and
P
i ccih =1 , ∀h.
Private investment by urban formal sector ﬁrms, ZP, is allocated between









,z z G + zzP =1 , (51)
where PK is the price of capital goods.
242.5 Proﬁts and Income
Firms’ proﬁts in the rural and urban informal sectors are given by
PROF i = PViVi − WiUi, for i = A,I. (52)
In addition to wages paid to both categories of workers, ﬁrms in the
private formal urban sector are subject to payroll taxes and pay interest on
the loans that they receive for working capital needs. Their proﬁts are thus
PROFP = PVPVP − (1 + IL)[(1 + paytaxU)WMUP +( 1+paytaxS)WSSP].
(53)
Firms in the formal urban economy also pay income taxes and interest
on their domestic and foreign borrowing, which serves to ﬁnance investment.
Their income therefore diﬀers from proﬁts, and is given by
YF P =( 1 −ftaxP)PROF P−IL·DLP,−1−ILF·DLFP,−1−IF
W·ER·FLP,−1,
(54)
where ftaxP is the corporate income tax rate, DLP and DLFP are investment-
related domestic- and foreign-currency loans allocated by domestic banks,
FLP foreign borrowing for the purpose also of physical capital accumula-
tion, ILF the interest rate charged on foreign-currency loans by domestic
banks, and IFW the interest rate on foreign loans.
Proﬁts from public production are given by
PROFG = PVGVG − (1 + paytaxU)WUGUG − (1 + paytaxS)WSGSG. (55)
Commercial banks’ proﬁts, PROFB,a r ed e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between
revenues from loans to ﬁrms (be it for working capital or investment needs, in
domestic and foreign currencies) and formal sector households, DLF,i n c o m e
from government bonds (perpetuities, whose nominal price is assumed ﬁxed
at unity), and interest payments on borrowing from the central bank plus
interest payments on both households’ deposits (denominated in domestic
and foreign currencies) and foreign loans:
PROF B = IL· (DLP,−1 + DLF,−1)+ILF · DLFP,−1 (56)











25where IR (respectively ID) is the interest rate on central bank ﬁnancing
(respectively domestic-currency denominated bank deposits), IB the nomi-
nal rate of return on government bonds, IDF the domestic interest rate on
foreign-currency deposits held in the domestic banking system by each cat-
egory of household h, FD h, GBT
B total government bond holdings by com-
mercial banks, DLB (respectively FLB) borrowing from the central bank
(respectively abroad), and DDh domestic-currency deposits by household h.
We assume that there are four categories of households in the economy.
Rural households,i d e n t i ﬁed with the sub-index A, consist of all workers em-
ployed in the rural sector. Informal sector households,i d e n t i ﬁed with the
sub-index I, consist of all the (unskilled) workers employed in the informal
economy. Formal sector households,i d e n t i ﬁed with the sub-index F, consist
of all workers (skilled and unskilled) employed in the formal sector, both
public and private. For all three groups, income is based on the return to
labor (salaries), distributed proﬁts, government transfers, remittances from
abroad, and interest receipts on holdings of ﬁnancial assets (net of borrowing
from domestic banks). The fourth group consists of proﬁte a r n e r s ,i d e n t i -
ﬁed with the sub-index E, whose income comes from ﬁrms’ net earnings in
the rural and formal private sectors, proﬁts of commercial banks, interest on
deposits, and government transfers.
Proﬁts from rural production are assumed to be distributed in proportion
0 <s h p A < 1 to rural households and 1 − shpA to (urban) proﬁte a r n e r s .
Using (52), income of rural households is given by
YH A = WAUA + shpAPROFA + γATRH+ ID· DDA,−1, (57)
where 0 <γ h < 1 is the portion of total government transfers (TRH)e a c h
household h receives, so that
P
h γh =1 ,a n dDDh domestic-currency de-
posits in domestic banks by households h. Rural and informal sector house-
holds are assumed not to hold foreign-currency deposits, either domestically
or abroad.
To capture the fact that ﬁr m si nt h ei n f o r m a lu r b a ns e c t o rt e n dt ob e
small, family-owned enterprises, we assume that households in that sector
own the ﬁrms in which they are employed. Using again (52), income of the
informal sector households is given by
YH I = PVIVI + γITRH+ ID· DDI,−1 + τIER· REMIT, (58)
where REMIT measures the foreign-currency value of the ﬂow of remittances
26from (unskilled) workers employed abroad, and 0 <τ I < 1 the fraction of
these remittances that are allocated to households in the informal economy.
Income of the formal sector household consists of net salaries (that is,
take-home pay) collected from private ﬁrms and the government, income
from formal sector ﬁrms, transfers from the government, remittances from
abroad, and interest receipts on deposits (in domestic and foreign currency,
held both domestically and abroad), net of interest payments on borrowing
from commercial banks:
















−IL· DLF,−1 +( 1− τI)ER· REMIT,
where 0 <s h p F
P ≤ 1 is the share of private formal sector ﬁrms’ net income
distributed to households in that sector, FD F foreign-currency deposits held
domestically, IFW
RF the risk-free foreign interest rate on foreign-currency de-
posits held abroad by household h, FDW
h ,a n dDLF domestic borrowing from
commercial banks. sstaxU and sstaxS are the social security taxes (assumed
proportional to the wage) that workers employed in the private formal sector
must pay.
Proﬁt earners receive a fraction 0 <s h p E
P ≤ 1 − shpF
P of private formal
sector ﬁrms’ retained earnings, as well as a share 1−shpA of proﬁts from the
rural sector, a share 0 <s h p E
B < 1 o fc o m m e r c i a lb a n k s ’i n c o m e ,PROF B,
and interest on bank deposits (held both domestically and abroad). Thus,
proﬁt earners’ income is:
YH E =( 1− shpA)PROFA + shp
E








where GBE‘ denotes government bond holdings by proﬁt earners, who are
the only category of households to hold such bonds. Note also that proﬁt
earners do not borrow directly from commercial banks or abroad.
2.6 Savings and Wealth Accumulation
Each category of household h saves a fraction, 0 <s r a t e h < 1,o fi t sd i s p o s -
able income:
SAVh = srateh(1 − inctaxh)YH h, (61)
27where 0 <i n c t a x h < 1 is the income tax rate applicable to household cate-
gory h.












0 > 0. (62)
In principle, given the portfolio structure described later, the expected
rate of return on other interest-bearing assets should also aﬀect the propen-
sity to save. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, the evidence for Turkey
suggests that it is mostly the real interest rate on domestic-currency deposits
that matters for private savings (see Ozcan, Gunay, and Ertac (2003)). For
simplicity, we therefore chose to exclude other rates of return from our spec-
iﬁcation.
The portion of disposable income that is not saved is allocated to con-
sumption:
CONh =( 1− inctaxh)YH h − SAVh. (63)
The total ﬂow of savings of each household category is channeled into
the accumulation of ﬁnancial wealth, WT h, which also accounts for valuation
eﬀects on the stock of foreign-currency deposits held domestically and abroad,
FDh and FDW
h , associated with changes in the nominal exchange rate:
WTh = WTh,−1 + SAVh + ∆ER· (FD h,−1 + FD
W
h,−1), (64)
with FD h = FDW
h =0for h = A,I.
2.7 Private Investment
The determinants of private investment in Turkey have been the subject
of a large literature, going back to, among others, Chibber and van Wijn-
bergen (1992), and including more recently studies by Guncavdi, Bleaney,
and McKay (1998, 1999) and Erden (2002). Chibber and van Wijnbergen
(1992), in a study over the period 1970-86, found that private investment in
Turkey depends positively on the rate of capacity utilization (which captures
aggregate demand pressures) and the ratio of private sector credit to GNP,
and negatively on the real eﬀective cost of borrowing and non-infrastructure
28public investment (which captures crowding out eﬀects associated with pub-
lic spending). Guncavdi, Bleaney, and McKay (1998) developed an error-
correction model in which private investment depends in the long run on
output and the relative cost of capital (as measured by the ratio of the cost
of credit to the wage rate), but can be inﬂuenced in the short run by the
availability of bank credit. Focusing on the period 1963-92, they found that,
following the ﬁnancial liberalization program implemented in the early 1980s,
private investment in Turkey became less sensitive to credit supply and some-
what more sensitive to the cost of capital. By contrast, Erden (2002), in a
study over the period 1968-98, found that both credit availability and uncer-
tainty over the cost of credit (rather than its level) aﬀect private investment,
the ﬁrst positively, and the second negatively.18 In a study covering the
period 1968-94, Guncavdi, Bleaney, and McKay (1999) found that ﬁnancial
liberalization (as measured by a dummy coeﬃcient for the post-1980 period)
appears to have had an adverse eﬀect on investment by raising the relative
cost of capital, and a positive eﬀect by reducing credit constraints. They also
ﬁnd evidence of a strong accelerator eﬀect (in both the short and the long
run) and overall public investment appears to have a signiﬁcant, negative
eﬀect on private capital formation.
The speciﬁcation of the determinants of private investment in our model
dwells on these results. As noted earlier, only ﬁrms in the private formal
urban sector invest in physical capital; their desired rate of capital accumu-
lation is assumed to depend on several factors. The ﬁrst is the public capital
stock in infrastructure (in proportion of the urban labor force), which has
a positive impact, through its complementarity eﬀect.19 The second is the
growth rate of real GDP, which captures the conventional accelerator eﬀect.
The third is the expected real cost of borrowing from domestic banks, which
has a negative eﬀect. Figure 4 illustrates well the positive correlation be-
tween changes in private investment and real output growth (the accelerator
eﬀect), as well as the tendency for private capital formation to evolve in
opposite direction to movements in real interest rates.20
18Neither one of these two studies accounts for the impact of public investment, as
in Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992). In addition, both studies use deposit rates to
measure the cost of credit–a debatable assumption, as discussed subsequently.
19See Agénor and Montiel (1999) and Agénor (2004, Chapter 2) for a detailed discussion
of this eﬀect and a review of the empirical evidence in general.
20In Figure 3 the deposit rate is used instead of the lending rate, because we do not have
suﬃciently long time series on the latter variable. This is far from being a good proxy for
29We do not account explicitly for the quantity of credit, in addition to
its cost, in our speciﬁcation of the investment function, for two reasons.
First, the evidence provided by Guncavdi, Bleaney, and McKay (1999), as
well as others, suggests that the impact of credit constraints on investment
is less signiﬁcant nowadays than was the case in the early 1980s, following
ﬁnancial reforms; at the same time, the (expected) cost of credit appears to
have become a more important consideration for ﬁrms.21 Second, even in
the context of the recent crisis, there is no strong evidence that the fall in
credit to private sector ﬁrms (at least the bigger ones) resulted from a credit
crunch, that is, a supply-induced contraction in lending; on the contrary, a
recent study by the World Bank (2003) suggests that demand-side factors
(high interest rates, low economic activity) were largely to blame. In fact,
as discussed later, we assume that the supply of bank loans to private sector
ﬁrms is perfectly elastic at the prevailing interest rate, and that only formal
sector households are subject to credit rationing.
Formally, the desired level of investment, Zd



















where NGDP is nominal GDP at market prices, deﬁned as the sum of value




PV iVi + INDTAX,




PCi(Ci + Gi + Z
i
P)+ZG + ER(wpeiEi − wpmiMi). (66)




PC i,0(Ci +Gi +Z
i
P)+ZG+ER0(wpei,0Ei −wpmi,0Mi), (67)
the cost of credit, for reasons that we discuss later on.
21It should be noted that Sancak (2002) did not ﬁnd any evidence that ﬁnancial lib-
eralization led to a relaxation of the borrowing constraints faced by Turkish ﬁrms in the
1980s and 1990s. However, the methodology that he used to test for structural breaks is
rather weak.
30where Zi
P =0for i = A,I, Gi =0for i = I,a n dEi =0for i = I,G.










PK −1 · ZP,−1
NGDP−2
),
where 0 <λ PINV < 1.
The private capital stock depends on the ﬂow level of investment and the
depreciation rate of capital from the previous period, 0 <δ P < 1:
KP = KP,−1(1 − δP)+ZP−1. (68)
2.8 Asset Allocation and the Credit Market
We consider in turn the determination of the portfolio structure of each
category of households, the demand for credit by ﬁrms, and the behavior of
commercial banks. The balance sheets of all agents (including the central
bank and the consolidated public sector) are summarized in Table 1.
2.8.1 Households
Households’ ﬁnancial wealth is allocated to ﬁve categories of assets: domes-
tic money (cash holdings, which bear no interest), Hh, domestic currency-
denominated bank deposits held at home, DDh, foreign currency-denominated
deposits held domestically, FD h, foreign currency-denominated deposits held
abroad, FDW
h , and holdings of government bonds, GBh. By allowing house-
holds to hold foreign-currency denominated deposits in the domestic banking
system, we therefore account for the high level of dollarized liabilities of the
Turkish ﬁnancial system. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, such deposits con-
tinue to account for a sizable share of total bank deposits in Turkey.22
Given liabilities of DLh,n e tﬁnancial wealth, WTh,i sd e ﬁned as
WTh = Hh + ER(FD h + FD
W
h )+DDh + GBh − DLh. (69)
As noted earlier, rural and informal sector households hold no foreign-
currency deposits, banks lend only to urban formal sector households (in
22See Civcir (2002) for a discussion of dollarization in Turkey. Note that our speciﬁcation
of dollarization on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets accounts only for foreign-currency
denominated loans to ﬁrms, not households.
31addition to formal sector ﬁrms), and only proﬁt earners hold government
bonds. Thus, in the above equation, FD h = FDW
h =0for h = A,I, DLh =0
for h 6= F,a n dGBh =0for h 6= E.
The demand function for currency by each household h is taken to be
positively related to consumption of that group (to capture a transactions
motive), CONh, and negatively to expected inﬂation, EINFL,a n dt h ei n -
terest rate on domestic-currency deposits, ID. In addition, for formal sector
households and proﬁte a r n e r s ,i ta l s od e p e n d sn e g a t i v e l yo nt h er a t eo fr e -
turn on foreign-currency denominated assets, deﬁned as a weighted average
of the interest rates on foreign-currency deposits held at home and abroad,
1+IDF and 1+IFW







































IF =0for h = A,I.T h e c o e ﬃcient κh
FD i st h er e l a t i v ew e i g h t
attached to the domestic interest rate on foreign-currency deposits held at
home in the overall measure of the rate of return on foreign-currency denom-






FD h,−1 + FDW
h,−1
,h = F,E. (71)








23Note that in equation (70), as well as in (74), (75) and (76), it is the risk-free world
interest rate (which is the relevant measure of the rate of return for lenders) that appears.
32To determine the allocation of bank deposits, we must distinguish between
rural and urban informal sector households, on the one hand, and formal sec-
tor households and proﬁt earners, on the other. For the ﬁrst group, which
holds no foreign-currency deposits, no government bonds, and does not bor-
row from banks, the demand for domestic-currency deposits can be obtained
from the wealth equation (69), given that (64) determines WT h and (70)
determines the demand for currency:
DD
d
h = WTh − H
d
h,h = A,I. (73)
For formal sector households and proﬁt earners, we assume that portfolio
choices follow a two-step process similar to the one described in Agénor and
Khan (1996). First, households determine the allocation between domestic-
and total foreign-currency denominated deposits (held either at home or
abroad). Second, they decide how to allocate total foreign-currency denomi-
nated deposits between deposits in the domestic banking system and deposits
abroad.
Formally, in the ﬁrst stage formal sector households and proﬁte a r n e r s
determine the ratio DDh/ER(FD h + FDW
h ) as a function of the interest
rate on domestic-currency deposits, on the one hand, and the overall rate of
return on foreign-currency denominated assets, deﬁned again as a weighted
















where h = F,E and κh
FD is as deﬁned earlier.24
In the second stage, the allocation of foreign-currency denominated de-










FD,h = F,E, (75)
which does not depend on exchange rate expectations.
24For proﬁt earners, both the demand for cash (equation (70)) and the relative demand
for domestic-currency deposits (equation (74)) could also be speciﬁed as negatively related
t ot h ee x p e c t e dr a t eo fr e t u r no ng o v e r n m e n tb o n d s .
33The second-stage portfolio decision is generally non-trivial because house-
holds may not be indiﬀerent as to the location of their deposits as a result,
for instance, of high transactions costs associated with shifting funds across
borders, or a perceived risk of conﬁscation–which could take for instance
the form of a forced conversion of foreign-currency deposits held in domestic
banks into assets denominated in domestic currency. If formal sector house-
holds and proﬁt earners were indiﬀerent as to the location of their foreign-
currency deposits, FD h and FDW
h would be perfect substitutes. In that case
θ
h
FD →∞and, in the absence of capital controls, the following interest rate




This condition implies that the interest rate on foreign-currency denomi-
nated deposits at home cannot deviate from the world risk-free interest rate.
In general, however, we will assume that foreign-currency deposits at home
and abroad are imperfect substitutes, and that (as discussed later) IDF is
set domestically by commercial banks.
The demand for government bonds by proﬁte a r n e r s ,GBd
E, measured as


















FD is deﬁn e di n( 7 1 )a n dEIB is the expected rate of return on
government bonds.
Note that, given (64), (70), (74), (75), and (76), the budget constraint (69)
can be used to determine residually the demand for one of the four interest-
bearing assets by proﬁt earners–for instance the demand for domestic-currency
bank deposits, in a manner similar to equation (73) for rural and informal
sector households:
DDE = WTE − HE − ER(FDE + FD
W
E ) − GBE.
Similarly, for formal sector households,




Domestic ﬁrms borrow both domestically (in domestic and foreign curren-
c i e s )a n da b r o a dn o to n l yt oﬁnance their working capital needs, as discussed
earlier, but also to ﬁnance their investment plans. Borrowing on world cap-
ital markets, FL P, is treated as exogenous. Taking into account retained
earnings, the investment ﬁnancing constraint requires that




P)YF P + ∆DL
T
P + ER· ∆FLP, (77)
where DLT
P represents total domestic borrowing from commercial banks.
Equation (77) can be solved for DLT










P)YF P − ER· ∆FLP. (78)
2.8.3 Commercial Banks
The balance sheet of commercial banks shows, on the asset side, loans to
formal sector households and private formal sector ﬁrms for investment pur-
poses, DLF+DLT
P, holdings of government bonds, GBT
B, and reserve require-
ments at the central bank, RR. On the liability side, it accounts for domestic-
and foreign-currency deposits by the public,
P
h(DDh+ER·FD h),b o r r o w -
ing from the central bank, DLB, and foreign loans (measured in domestic-
currency terms), ER · FLB.W i t h NWB denoting commercial banks’ net










Reserve requirements are assumed to be levied at the same proportional




(DDh + ER· FDh), (80)
where 0 < rreq < 1 is the (eﬀective) reserve requirement rate. For simplicity,
banks are assumed to hold no excess liquid reserves.
Firms’ total domestic borrowing from commercial banks is deﬁned as
DL
T
P = DLP + ER· DLFP,
35which implies, using (78),
DLP = DL
T
P − ER· DLFP. (81)
Foreign-currency loans to domestic ﬁrms are assumed to remain constant
relative to banks’ foreign currency liabilities, which consist of foreign bor-
rowing and foreign currency deposits from households:





ER· FD h). (82)
Commercial banks’ holdings of government bonds, GBT











B is direct placement of bonds by the government and GBd
B is
additional commercial banks’ demand for bonds. Direct bond placement
with commercial banks is given as a constant share of the total outstanding








GB > 0. (84)
The additional demand for government bonds by commercial banks (as a
ratio of net wealth) is positively related to the interest rate on these bonds













GB > 0, (85)
where EIB is again the expected rate of return on government bonds. We as-
sume that due to existing banking regulations, domestic banks cannot choose
to allocate freely a fraction of their wealth to holdings of foreign bonds; as a
result, we exclude the rate of return on foreign-currency assets from (85).
The demand for foreign loans by commercial banks depends on the cost
of domestic funding from households and the central bank, in addition to
the (premium-inclusive) cost of foreign borrowing. Given the arbitrage con-
ditions described later (equations (89) and (91)), this demand function can
be speciﬁed only as a function of the oﬃcial interest rate, IR,a n dt h ew o r l d
25This placement rule can be thought of as accounting for the bonds held by public
banks, which are not explicitly modelled.














FL > 0. (86)
This equation implies that if domestic and foreign borrowing are perfect
substitutes (that is, θ
B
FL →∞ ), then the central bank’s reﬁnancing rate




As indicated earlier, banks’ net income is distributed in proportion shpE
B








where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents retained earnings by
commercial banks and the second term represents capital losses (gains) as-
sociated with nominal exchange rate depreciations (appreciations).
Lending by commercial banks to formal sector households, DLF,i sa s -
sumed exogenous. This is consistent with the recent evidence suggesting
that in Turkey households–and to some extent small businesses–appear to
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by supply-side constraints on the credit market (see
World Bank (2003)). By contrast, lending to ﬁrms is taken to be demand
determined, as shown in equation (78). At the same time, banks have access
to an inﬁnitely elastic supply of loans by the central bank at the prevailing
oﬃcial interest rate. They therefore borrow whatever residual liquidity they
need, given their domestic deposit base and foreign borrowing. DLB is thus
determined residually from the balance sheet constraint (79), that is, using
(80):








(DDh + ER· FDh) − ER· FL B − NWB. (88)
372.8.4 Interest Rates and Risk Premia
Banks set both deposit and lending interest rates. The deposit rate on do-
mestic currency-denominated deposits, ID, is set equal to the cost of funds
provided by the central bank, IR:
1+ID =1+IR. (89)
This speciﬁcation implies that banks are indiﬀerent as to the source of
their domestic-currency funds–or, equivalently, they view domestic-currency
deposits and loans from the central bank as perfect substitutes (at the mar-
gin).26 The lower panel of Figure 5 shows the behavior of the deposit rate, the
m o n e ym a r k e tr a t e( t h er a t ea tw h i c hb a n k sb o r r o wf r o me a c ho t h e r )a n dt h e
three-month repurchase rate (which can be viewed as the policy rate, IR).
The ﬁgure shows that, although there are periods during which the three
r a t e st e n dt oe v o l v ei nd i ﬀerent directions, the degree of synchronization ap-
pears to have increased in recent years. We therefore view the “pricing” (or
arbitrage) condition (89) as a reasonable approximation to current facts.
The interest rate on foreign-currency deposits at home is set on the ba-




In turn, IFW depends on the world risk-free interest rate, IFW
RF,a n da n




RF)(1 + EXTPR). (91)
Combining equations (75), (90), and (91) implies that the allocation of
foreign-currency deposits between home and abroad by formal sector house-
26Altnernatively, it could be assumed that there is imperfect substitution between bor-
rowed reserves and deposits. The deposit rate could then be speciﬁed as a positive function
of both the cost of borrowing from the central bank and variables such as the expected
inﬂation rate.







The external risk premium consists of two components: an exogenous
element, denoted CONTAG, which captures idiosyncratic changes in “sen-
timent” on world capital markets (including contagion eﬀects), and an en-
dogenous component, which captures the perceived degree of country risk










where κERP > 0 and the quadratic form is used to capture the idea that the
external risk premium is a convex function of the debt-to-export ratio.28
The impact of expectations of exchange rate depreciation on the interest
rate on foreign-currency deposits in the domestic banking system can be
gauged from Figure 6, which shows the behavior of three-month deposit
rates on Turkish liras and U.S. dollars. The lower panel of the ﬁgure shows
a dramatic fall in the expected depreciation rate in late 1999, which tends to
indicate that the stabilization program introduced at that time gained rapid
credibility. However, the data also show that the credibility gain disappeared
equally rapidly in the ensuing months. Figure 7 displays a measure of the
external risk premium for Turkey, J. P. Morgan’s stripped spread for that
country. The ﬁgure shows as well the behavior of the spread from J. P.
Morgan’s emerging markets bond index (EMBI). Co-movements in the two
series tend to capture “contagion” eﬀects, which are apparent in the period
leading up to Argentina’s peso crisis for instance.
The interest rate on domestic-currency loans, IL,i ss e ta sap r e m i u m
over the marginal cost of funds. Given the arbitrage conditions (89) and
27Note the importance of distinguishing between the premium-inclusive world interest
rate faced by domestic borrowers, IFW, on the basis of which banks set the interest rate
on foreign-currency deposits held domestically, and the risk-free rate faced by lenders,
IFW
RF,w h i c ha ﬀects the demand for deposits held abroad by households. In the absence of
a risk premium, both rates would be equal and, given the pricing condition (90), equation
(75) would imply that the ratio FDh/FDW
h is constant over time.
28In line with the results of Fiess (2003) for several middle-income Latin American coun-
tries, the country risk premium could also be made a function of the domestic public debt
to GDP ratio. This would provide an additional channel through which ﬁscal consolidation
may aﬀect the economy.
39(90), this cost is simply a weighted average of the cost of borrowing from
the central bank (or, equivalently, the deposit rate), and borrowing on world
capital markets. Taking into account as well the (implicit) cost of holding
reserve requirements, the lending rate is thus determined by
1+IL=
{(1 + IR)κB
DL[(1 + IFW)(1 + EDEPR)]1−κB
DL}
(1 + DOMPR )−1(1 − rreq)
, (93)
where 0 <κ B
DL < 1 denotes the relative share of domestic-currency borrowing





hDDh,−1 + DLB,−1 P
h DDh,−1 + DLB,−1 + ER−1(
P
h FDh,−1 + FLB,−1)
,
and DOMPR is the domestic risk premium, which is inversely related to the




DLP,−1 + ER−1(DLFP,−1 + FLP,−1)
¸−κDRP
, (94)
where κDRP > 0 and 0 <δ c ≤ 1.
The risk premium charged by banks reﬂects the perceived risk of de-
fault on their loans to domestic ﬁrms. The link between the premium
and ﬁrms’ net worth has been much emphasized in the recent literature on
real-ﬁnancial sector linkages. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000), and
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2001), in particular, emphasized the impact
of collateralizable wealth on bank pricing decisions.29 The higher the value
of ﬁrms’ physical assets (which measures “pledgeable” collateral), PK· KP,
or an “eﬀective” fraction δc of that amount, relative to both domestic and
foreign ﬁnancial liabilities, DLP + ER· (DLFP + FL P), the higher the pro-
p o r t i o no ft o t a ll e n d i n gt h a tb a n k sc a nr e c o u pi nt h ee v e n to fd e f a u l t .T h i s
reduces the risk premium and the cost of borrowing.
This speciﬁcation has important implications for understanding the in-
teractions between the real and ﬁnancial sides in the model. A large nominal
29Collateralizable wealth (or the net present value of ﬁrms’ proﬁts) could also act as a
quantity constraint on bank borrowing, as for instance in the models of Krishnamurthy
(2003), which extends the analysis of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Xie and Yuen
(2003). In both settings, shocks to credit-constrained ﬁrms are ampliﬁed through changes
in collateral values and transmitted to output. See, however, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) for
a dissenting view on the ability of collateral constraints to generate output ampliﬁcation.
40exchange rate depreciation (that is, a rise in ER), would reduce ﬁrms’ net
worth, thereby raising the cost of capital and leading to a contraction of
private investment. In turn, this would exert contractionary pressures. The
extent to which output contracts would depend, in a general equilibrium
setting, on the elasticity of the demand for loans. In the model, the de-
mand for loans is residually determined to ﬁnance investment expenditures
(see equation (78)), whose desired level depends on both the growth rate of
output and the real lending rate (see equation (65)). The direct eﬀect of a
rise in the lending rate resulting from lower net worth would reduce desired
investment and the demand for domestic loans, thereby oﬀsetting at least to
some extent the impact of a currency depreciation on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial liabil-
ities (which operates through ER· (DLFP + FLP)), by reducing DLP and
DLFP.
In addition, if households are net creditors in foreign currency (as is the
case here), the depreciation could have a positive eﬀect on private spend-
ing (through its impact on disposable income), thereby stimulating output.
In general, therefore, the extent to which a currency depreciation is con-
tractionary through its eﬀect on the risk premium depends not only on the
elasticity of the premium with respect to net worth but also the sensitivity
of investment to the lending rate and the magnitude of wealth eﬀects on
consumption.
Changes in the risk premium may explain why, in practice, spreads be-
tween the loan and deposit rates appear to ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly over time,
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5 . 30 In fact, as suggested in Figure 8, the bank lending
spread tends to follow a counter-cyclical pattern. This behavior is consistent
with the view that, in downswings, the value of borrowers’ collateral tends
to fall–as a result of a fall in asset prices in general, and in our case more
speciﬁcally a drop in the price of capital goods.31 With the perceived risk of
default increasing, and the value of “seizable” collateral falling, banks may
30Other factors that aﬀect the behavior of lending-deposit spreads include, of course, op-
erating costs (which we abstract from), taxation, changes in banks’ degree of risk aversion,
and changes in market structure and the degree of competition. Indeed, in Turkey banks
and borrowers are subject to a variety of taxes–the banking and insurance transaction
tax, the foreign exchange transaction tax, and a tax levy on checks, among others. In addi-
tion, depositors must pay up to 20 percent in withholding tax on interest income. Spreads
tend to be larger for loans in Turkish lira, as opposed to foreign currency. Nevertheless,
we abstract from these other considerations.
31Note that the spread could also be made a direct function of the level of economic
activity (or the output gap), as for instance in Atta-Mensah and Dib (2003).
41charge a higher premium, as hypothesized in (94). To our knowledge, there
has not been any systematic study of the link between collateral and lending
spreads in Turkey; given the obvious importance of this mechanism in the
model, we will assess the sensitivity of the simulation results reported later
to alternative values of κDRP, the parameter measuring the elasticity of the
domestic premium to the “eﬀective” collateral-to-liability ratio.
Banks are indiﬀerent between lending in domestic or foreign currency.
Thus, the interest rate on foreign-currency denominated loans, ILF,i sd e -
termined from the arbitrage condition
(1 + ILF)(1 + EDEPR)=1+IL. (95)
2.9 Public Sector
The public sector in our framework consists of the central bank and the
government. We specify each agent’s budget constraint (in stock and ﬂow
terms for the central bank) and account for transfers between them. We also
discuss the determination of oﬃcial interest rates, as well as the composition
of public investment.
2.9.1 Central Bank
The balance sheet of the central bank consists of, on the asset side, loans to
commercial banks, DLB, foreign reserves, FF, changes in which are taken as
exogenous (possibly reﬂecting central bank intervention aimed at managing
the exchange rate), and government bonds, GBCB. Liabilities consist of the
monetary base, MB.W i t h NWCB denoting the central bank’s net worth,
we have
DLB + ER· FF + GBCB − NWCB = MB. (96)
The monetary base is the sum of currency in circulation, Hs,a n dr e q u i r e d
reserves, RR:
MB = H
s + RR. (97)
Assuming no operating costs, net proﬁts of the central bank, PROF CB,
are given by the sum of interest receipts on loans to commercial banks, and
interest receipts on holdings of foreign assets and government bonds:
PROFCB = IR· DLB,−1 + IF
W
RFER· FF + IB· GBCB,−1. (98)
42Af r a c t i o nshpG of the central bank’s proﬁts are transferred to the gov-
ernment. Thus, the central bank’s net worth evolves over time according
to:
NWCB = NWCB,−1 +( 1− shpG)PROF CB + ∆ER· FF−1, (99)
where the last term represents valuation eﬀects. Thus, exchange rate changes
that aﬀect the domestic-currency value of the central bank’s stock of foreign
reserves do not aﬀect the monetary base; these capital gains and losses are
instead absorbed via changes in the central bank’s net worth. Taking ﬁrst
diﬀerences of (96) and using (99), the monetary base changes according to
∆MB = ∆DLB + ER· ∆FF + ∆GBCB − (1 − shpG)PROFCB, (100)
where the last term is zero if all central bank proﬁts are transferred to the
government (shpG =1 ).
As noted earlier, the supply of liquidity to commercial banks by the cen-
tral bank is taken to be perfectly elastic at the prevailing oﬃcial interest
rate IR, which is itself treated as predetermined. Alternatively, we could
endogenize the oﬃcial interest rate by specifying a monetary policy reaction
function that would relate IR to, say, the output gap, and deviations of
inﬂation from a target value, as in Taylor-type rules (see Svensson (2003)).
Experiments with feedback rules of this type would be particularly impor-
tant for Turkey, given the expected move to a (ﬂexible) inﬂation targeting
framework in the near future.
2.9.2 Government Budget
The government primary balance, PRBAL,c a nb ed e ﬁned as
PRBAL= TXREV + PROF G + shpGPROFCB, (101)
−WSGS
E
G − TRH− PG· G − PC PZG
where TXREV represents total tax revenues, PROF G proﬁts by the gov-
ernment from sales of the public good (deﬁn e di n( 5 5 ) ) ,shpGPROF CB the
share of central bank proﬁts transferred to the government, WSGSE
G salaries
of teachers in public education, TRH total government transfers to house-
holds, and G real government consumption of goods and services. Public
investment, ZG, is valued at the sales price of the composite private formal
sector good, PC P, because it is assumed to consist of expenditure on the
private formal composite good only.
43The overall ﬁscal balance, OVBAL,i sd e ﬁned as
OVBAL = PRBAL− IF
W
G · ER· FLG,−1 − IB· GB−1, (102)
where the last two terms account for interest payments on foreign loans
(at an exogenous rate IFW
G ) and payments on government bonds held by





B + GBCB + GBE. (103)
Total tax revenues consist of direct taxes, DIRTAX, indirect taxes on
goods and services, INDTAX, as well as payroll taxes on employers in the
formal private sector and in public production, and social security contribu-
tions by employees in the private sector:33











Direct income taxes are levied on households (except those in the informal




inctaxhYH h + ftaxPPROF P.
Indirect taxes consist of revenue from import tariﬀs, taxes on gross pro-













32Note that non-residents are assumed not to hold domestic government bonds, in line
with the evidence for Turkey, which suggests that such holdings are relatively small. This
component–which would alter not only (103) but also the balance-of-payments equilib-
rium condition (108)–can be easily added.
33Although payroll taxes incurred in the production of public services appear in the
deﬁnition of total tax revenues, they have no eﬀect on the primary balance because (as
shown in (55)) they are netted out of proﬁts transferred to the government.
44Public investment consists of investment in infrastructure (roads, power
p l a n t s ,h o s p i t a l s ,a n ds oo n ) ,IINF, and investment in education (school
buildings, libraries, and so on, IEDU, which are both considered given in real
terms:
ZG = IINF + IEDU. (105)
Accumulation of each type of capital evolves according to
Ki =( 1− δi)Ki,−1 + Ii,−1,i = INF,EDU, (106)
where 0 <δ i < 1 is a depreciation rate.
The model closure speciﬁes a ﬁx e dg r o w t hp a t hf o rg o v e r n m e n tb o n di s -
suing and foreign borrowing. With no central bank ﬁnancing, and exogenous
foreign borrowing (in foreign-currency terms), the government budget deﬁcit,
−OVBAL, is therefore given from “below the line”:
−OVBAL = ER· ∆FL G + ∆GB
s. (107)
Given the path of the overall ﬁscal balance set by (107), equation (102)
is solved for the primary balance, PRBAL, and (101) residually for the level
of transfers to households, TRH.
2.10 The Balance of Payments and the Exchange Rate
Because foreign reserves are constant, the balance-of-payments constraint
implies that any current account imbalance must be compensated by a net
ﬂow of foreign capital, given by the sum of changes in households’ holdings
of foreign-currency denominated deposits abroad,
P
h ∆FDW
h , changes in
foreign loans made to the government, ∆FLG, and to private ﬁrms, ∆FLP
(both taken to be exogenous), changes in loans to domestic banks, ∆FLB,
minus the change in oﬃcial reserves (also assumed to be exogenous), ∆FF,





























45where REMIT is the ﬂow of remittances, deﬁned as
REMIT = κREMWFFORL −1, 0 <κ REM < 1,
with WF denoting again the foreign wage (measured in foreign-currency
terms), FORLthe number of Turkish nationals working abroad, and κREM
the share of wages being remitted. In turn, FORLis given by
FORL=( 1− δIMIG)FORL −1 + IMIG, (109)
where 0 <δ IMIG < 1 is the rate of “attrition” of the stock of migrants and
IMIG is determined by equation (39). Equation (108) determines implicitly
the equilibrium nominal exchange rate.
2.11 Currency and Bond Market Equilibrium
With equation (100) determining changes in the monetary base, MB,t h e
supply of domestic currency can be derived from equation (97):
H
s = MB− RR. (110)










The equilibrium condition of the market for government bonds, which






B + GBCB, (112)











GB + GBCB (113)
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This equation can be solved for the expected bond rate, EIB.
462.12 Price Determination
Value added prices, PVi, are given by adjusting gross prices, PX i, for pro-











where protaxI =0because there is no indirect taxation of informal sector
output.
The world prices of imported and exported goods, wpei and wpmi,a r e
taken to be exogenously given. The domestic currency price of these goods
is obtained by adjusting the world price by the nominal exchange rate, with
import prices also adjusted by the tariﬀ rate, tm:
PEi = wpeiER, for i = A,P, (115)
PM i = wpmi(1 + tmi)ER, for i = A,P. (116)
Gross output prices of the rural and urban private goods, PX A and PX P,
are derived from the expenditure identity:
PX i =
PD iDi + PE iEi
Xi
, for i = A,P. (117)
For the informal and public sectors (both of which do not export and do
not compete with imports), the price of gross output is equal to the domestic
price, PDi,o n l y :
PX i = PD i, for i = I,G. (118)
For the rural sector and formal private urban production, the composite
price is determined accordingly by the expenditure identity:34
PQ i =
PD iDi + PM iMi
Qi
, for i = A,P. (119)
34In principle, the cost functions derived from ﬁrst-order conditions for the CET and
CES aggregation functions (3), (11) and (41) could be used to determine PXand PQprices
in these two sectors. However, because CES and CET functions are linearly homogeneous,
the cost functions can be replaced with the accounting identities shown in equations (117)
and (119); the ﬁrst-order conditions are incorporated in the export supply and import
demand functions, (40) and (42).
47Prices of the composite inputs J1 and J2 are derived in similar fashion,
as a result of the linear homogeneity of the nested CES production functions
imposed in the production of private formal urban goods:
PJ1 = J
−1
1 {PROFP +( 1+IL−1)(1 + paytaxS)WSPSP}, (120)
PJ 2 = J
−1
2 {PJ1 · J1 +( 1+IL−1)(1 + paytaxU)WUPUP}, (121)
where PROFP,a sd e ﬁned earlier, denotes proﬁts of private ﬁrms in the urban
formal sector.
The price of capital is deﬁned as a geometric weighted average of the sales
prices of the goods for which there is investment demand, namely, the public







where PC i = PD i for i = G.








Markets for informal goods and government services clear continuously;










These conditions are used to determine PD I and PD G.
As in Karadag and Westaway (1999), the value added tax is modeled as
an ad valorem tax on purchases of ﬁnal goods.35 Speciﬁcally, the sales price
for the rural and formal private sector goods, PC i,d i ﬀers from the composite
price as a result of a sales tax, levied at the rate 0 <s a l t a x i < 1:
PC i =( 1+saltaxi)PQi, for i = A,P.












35Indeed, in Turkish ﬁscal accounts, what is referred to as the “value added tax” is
actually an ad valorem sales tax. We therefore chose to model it as applying to composite
good prices, instead of value added prices.
48where 0 <w r i,wu i < 1 are the relative weights of good i in each index.




i wui =1 )a n da r eﬁxed according
to the share of each of these goods in rural and urban consumption in the
base period. Finally, the aggregate price level, CPI,i sd e ﬁned as a weighted






where 0 <w c p<1 is the relative share of spending by rural households in
total consumption. The inﬂation rate is simply
INFL = ∆CPI/CPI−1. (126)
2.13 Default Risk, Credibility, and Expectations
Our analysis of default risk dwells on the presumption that, faced with an
unsustainable ﬁscal deﬁcit, a government can either take ﬁscal measures to
increase revenue, or be tempted to default at some point in the future–either
through monetization or outright repudiation. In practice, governments are
often tempted to resort to monetization as deﬁcits and public debt rise be-
cause of constraints in the ability to adjust taxes; the increase in tax rates
or in the tax base necessary to balance the budget may be large and politi-
cally unfeasible. The inﬂation tax may be an easier option, because it is the
accumulation of debt that leads to a perverse increase in interest payments.
In addition, there are no explicit costs associated with collecting the inﬂa-
tion tax, whereas with “conventional” taxes collection costs may be a convex
function of the amount of revenue raised. In the Turkish case, however, we
also view outright debt repudiation as a source of concern by asset holders.
Expectations concerning the possibility of default will therefore aﬀect their
current behavior.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the demand for government bonds is aﬀected
by the probability that the government will opt for (partial) default, in the
form of either outright repudiation or monetization to ﬁnance its deﬁcits.36
Private investors assign a nonzero probability to default in the current period.
The expected rate of return will reﬂect this probability, and they will demand
36In principle, as noted by Masson (1985), changes in the perceived risk of default will
also afect the marginal rate of substitution across periods, and thus saving. In the present
setting, however, intertemporal considerations by households are not directly captured,
and thus we ignore this eﬀect.
49compensation in the form of a higher nominal interest rate on government
bonds. Thus, the expected rate of return on government bonds, EIB,c a n
be deﬁned as
EIB =( 1− PDEF)IB, (127)
where PDEF is the subjective probability of default, which is supposed to





This speciﬁcation shows that, when debt is zero, the probability of de-
fault is also zero; by contrast, as the stock of debt (relative to tax revenues)
increases without bounds, the perceived risk of default approaches unity. Put
diﬀerently, the larger the stock of debt is in relation to the capacity to repay,
the higher the perceived risk of default.38
The view underlying our speciﬁcation in (128) is that tax revenues are
constrained by some upper bound, whereas the real value of the outstanding
debt (and of the debt service) can be signiﬁcantly reduced by a surprise in-
crease in the rate of inﬂation.39 The outcome of a postponement of action on
the deﬁcit would then eventually translate into a steadily increasing interest
rate on government bonds, as a result of two factors. First, demand for these
bonds depends on the expected rate of return, which is the product of the
probability of repayment times the interest rate, as shown in equation (127).
For a given probability of default, a continued increase in the supply of bonds
will require an increase in interest rates, to induce investors to hold them.
This can be seen by combining the solution to condition (113) and equation





37Note that using GDP as a scale variable instead of tax revenue in the probability of
default would not be appropriate here, because neither agriculture nor the informal sector
are subject to taxation. Thus, an increase in GDP resulting from higher output from
either one of those sectors would not signal a greater capacity to repay.
38In principle, the government could meet its debt obligations by cutting spending (or
selling assets) instead of raising taxes. Our view, however, is that (given the large share
of spending allocated to wages and interest payments) most of the adjustment to cover
obligations in case of default would have to come from higher tax revenues.
39See Spaventa (1987) for a detailed discussion of the view that governments typically
face a limit to the tax burden that they can impose on their citizens–notably because of
adverse eﬀects on incentives and income distribution.
50where Λ(·) is a functional form that depends positively on GBs and the
dots represent the other determinants of the demand for government bonds
by domestic banks and proﬁt earners. An increase in the supply of bonds
GBs,f u e l e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h eg o v e r n m e n td e ﬁcit, would indeed raise the
equilibrium bond rate, everything else equal.
Second, an increase in the stock of public debt will lead (with a one-
period lag) to a rise in the perceived probability of default by investors,
which will also tend to lead to higher interest rates on government bonds.
As can be inferred from the previous equation, an increase in PDEF would
indeed raise the equilibrium bond rate. The rise in interest rates would in
turn worsen the overall deﬁcit of the government–making the adoption of
corrective ﬁscal policies inevitable. Higher interest rates therefore make an
unsustainable ﬁscal policy more unsustainable, hastening the need for policy
reforms.
To model credibility, we assume that the expected rate of inﬂation (which
aﬀects directly the demand for domestic currency, private investment, saving
rates, and wage formation in the private formal sector), is given as a weighted
average of the perceived (or explicitly announced) inﬂation target of the
central bank, INFLTARG, and the one-period lagged inﬂation rate:
EINFL = CREDIB · INFL
TARG+( 1− CREDIB)INFL−1, (130)
where INFL is deﬁned in (126) and 0 <C R E D I B<1 is our measure of
credibility, deﬁned as
CREDIB =1− PDEF. (131)
Credibility in our framework depends therefore only on ﬁscal policy; the
stance or eﬀectiveness of monetary policy (as measured, for instance, by
deviations between actual and target inﬂation rates) plays no role.40 Full
credibility (CREDIB =1 ) occurs only if the probability of default PDEF
is zero. An increase in the probability of default lowers credibility and leads
40In Ozatay (2000) and Civcir (2002), credibility is measured by the average maturity of
new domestic non-indexed public debt issues. However, maturity is treated as an exoge-
nous variable, instead of being (inversely) related to the debt-to-GDP ratio, as one would
expect. For other ways of modeling credibility involving forward-looking expectations in
stochastic models, see Laxton, Ricketts, and Rose (1994), Huh and Lansing (1999), Isard,
Laxton, and Eliasson (2001), and Erceg and Levin (2003). For econometric studies, see
Ruge-Murcia (1995) and Agénor and Taylor (1992).
51agents to reduce the weight attached to the inﬂation target in forming expec-
tations (thereby imparting greater persistence to inﬂation), because default
is associated with a perceived increase in the risk of monetization and thus
higher future inﬂation. In a sense, therefore, inﬂation expectations depend
essentially on the ﬁscal stance–in line with the empirical results of Celasun,
Gelos and Prati (2004), based on survey data for Turkey. Although they do
not provide a formal characterization of their argument, they note (p. 494)
that “...A credible ﬁscal consolidation is probably the key to reducing inﬂa-
tion, because inﬂation expectations will decline only if the public perceives
that the need to monetize ﬁscal deﬁcits or inﬂate away the debt stock has
come to an end.”41
The expected nominal depreciation rate, EDEPR,w h i c ha ﬀects portfolio
d e c i s i o n sa n dt h ep r i c i n gr u l e so fc o m m e r c i a lb a n k s ,i sd e ﬁned as a weighted
average of its past value and expected changes in the real exchange rate,
measured as the diﬀerence between expected domestic inﬂation (given in
(130)) and foreign inﬂation, FINFL, with a one-period lag:
EDEPR = χEDEPR−1 +( 1− χ)(EINFL− FINFL −1), (132)
where 0 <χ<1. Thus, when domestic inﬂation is expected to exceed foreign
inﬂation, that is, when the real exchange rate is expected to appreciate,
agents will also expect the nominal exchange rate to depreciate, to prevent
a loss in competitiveness.42
Note that in the model exogenous changes in the probability of default
lead in general to an inverse correlation between credibility and the govern-
ment bond rate. An increase in PDEF, for instance, raises directly the bond
41They also found that inﬂation expectations appear to be forward-looking, rather than
backward-looking. However, this result is not consistent with those obtained by Agénor
and Bayraktar (2002), who found that forward- and backward-looking components have
similar weights in expectations.
42Alternatively, it could be assumed that expectations are rational (or, more precisely,
model consistent), so that the expected depreciation rate is equal to the one-period ahead
“actual” rate, as derived from the model itself. This, however, is a lot more involved from
a computational standpoint. Other options, as suggested to us by Peter Montiel, would be
to make the expected future exchange rate a function of the current spot rate (with some
elasticity parameter linking the two, and with perhaps a “shift” term to capture exogenous
changes in exchange rate expectations), or to make the expected future exchange rate
proportional to the model’s steady-state solution for the exchange rate, with the factor of
proportionality representing the perceived rate at which the exchange rate converges to
its steady-state value.
52rate, as implied by (129). At the same time, it also reduces credibility, as
implied by (131), thereby raising expected inﬂation, as can be inferred from
(130), as long as INFL−1 >I NFL TARG. In turn, higher expected inﬂation
raises the expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, as im-
plied by (132). From (76), and the equilibrium condition (113), the rise in
EDEPR lowers the demand for government bonds by households. With a
ﬁxed supply of bonds, this requires an oﬀsetting increase in EIB,t h a ti s ,a
rise in IB itself (as implied by (127)), which compounds the initial eﬀect of
t h ei n c r e a s ei nPDEF on the actual bond rate.
3 Calibration and Solution
Appendix C reviews the structure of the ﬁnancial SAM that underlies the
model, our calibration procedure, and the parameter values (estimated and
non-estimated) that we use in the behavioral equations. A more detailed
description of the data and adjustment procedures used to construct the
ﬁnancial SAM is provided in Jensen and Yeldan (2004). Essentially, the
calibration of the model was done by building a Financial Social Accounting
Matrix (FSAM). The FSAM itself was built in two steps: a) construction of a
MacroSAM; and b) disaggregation into a MicroSAM. The construction of the
MacroSAM was split into a real MacroSAM and a ﬁnancial MacroSAM. The
link between the two types of MacroSAMs was made through the savings-
investment balance account.
The solution of the model is performed with GAMS. When solving the
model, the equilibrium condition (111) is dropped from the system as a result
of Walras’ law–if all other markets but the money market are in continuous
equilibrium, then the money market must be in continuous equilibrium as
well. That this is indeed the case is checked automatically when solving the
model.
4 Policy Experiments
In this section, we report two sets of experiments. The ﬁrst aims to analyze
the real and ﬁnancial eﬀects of a disinﬂation program taking the form of a
permanent increase in the oﬃcial interest rate. The second set relates to
ﬁscal adjustment and considers two scenarios: an increase in the VAT rate
53a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t eo ni n c o m eo fp r o ﬁt earners. The public sector
closure rule implies that transfers to households adjust to clear the public
sector budget.43 In both cases we focus on the impact of these policies on the
sustainability of domestic public debt and the behavior of the labor market.
We refer to eﬀects occurring in the ﬁrst two years as the “short run,” those
occurring between the third and ﬁfth years as the “medium run,” and those
occurring between the seventh and the tenth year as the “long run.”
As noted earlier, the growth path for domestic bond ﬁnancing is exoge-
nously speciﬁed in the baseline solution.44 The bond market also includes
a placement rule whereby the government places a pre-determined fraction
of the outstanding stock of bonds with commercial banks. The remaining
share of outstanding bonds are allocated among commercial banks and proﬁt
earners according to their respective portfolio-balance equations. As can be
inferred from (113) and (129), it is this secondary allocation of bond holdings
that determines (together with the supply of bonds, the probability of default,
and interest rates on alternative assets) the equilibrium bond rate. The two
ﬁscal experiments are carried out using a non-neutral public sector closure.
Thus, given that the overall balance is ﬁxed by (107), the tax adjustment
aﬀects the size of the primary balance (as implied by (102)) and transfers
to households (as inferred from (101)). In turn, transfers aﬀect households’
disposable income, private spending, and tax revenue. As a result of this
closure rule, in each experiment deviations of the probability of default from
its baseline value will reﬂect essentially changes in tax revenues, which are
themselves closely correlated with activity in the formal sector (given that
the rural and informal sectors are essentially untaxed).
4.1 Increase in Oﬃcial Interest Rates
We ﬁrst consider a permanent, 5 percentage point increase in the oﬃcial
interest rate, IR. Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The inﬂation rate
is reduced signiﬁcantly in the short run by almost 3.8 percent, and remains
below its baserun value until period 6. The medium run maximum reduction
43Given this closure rule, the simulation results would be signiﬁcantly aﬀected if we were
to assume that in the probability of default it is taxes net of transfers that matter, instead
of taxes per se. However, doing so would implicitly amount to assuming that transfers
would not be cut to redeem the debt in case of default.
44Note that, because GDP changes across experiments, the debt-to-GDP ratio will also
change, despite the fact that the growth rate of the stock of public debt is constant.
54in the price level (in both rural and urban areas) is around 9 percent while
the long-run reduction is around 5.5 percent. The general reduction in the
level of prices is the consequence of changes in factor costs and the relative
demand and supply of goods and services. Indeed, the increase in the oﬃcial
rate raises the lending rate, which in turn exerts two types of direct eﬀects:
ﬁrst, it leads to a reduction in formal sector wages through an increase in
the cost of working capital; second, it leads to a strong decline in investment
demand for formal sector goods.
The reduction in formal sector wages leads to a fall in real disposable
income for the formal sector household. Because formal sector households
have a relatively high consumption share of formal sector goods, the relative
demand for formal sector goods tends to decline. In this way, the reduction
in formal sector wages tends to be self-reinforcing. At the same time, the
reduction in formal sector disposable income is exacerbated by the strong
increase in the bond rate, despite a concomitant increase in deposit rate.
The increase in the bond rate leads to higher interest payments by the gov-
ernment on its debt and (as a result of the public sector budget closure)
a decline in transfers to households. The reduction in household transfers
aﬀects mostly the formal sector household and proﬁt earners, because they
are the main beneﬁciaries of public transfers. But the reduction in income
is more pronounced for formal sector households, because they are aﬀected
adversely not only by the reduction in transfers, but also by the increase in
the cost of borrowing. Indeed, because formal sector households (which are
the only ones borrowing from banks) are net debtors in the initial scenario,
their net borrowing costs increase, despite the fact that the increase in the
deposit rate (which matches the increase in the oﬃcial rate) cushions the
impact of the higher lending rate. Overall, real disposable income of for-
mal sector households decline by around 12 percent in the medium run (see
Table 3, period 5) and 5 percent in the long run (see Table 3, period 10).
In contrast, proﬁt earners (who do not borrow directly from banks) bene-
ﬁt relatively strongly from increasing interest receipts on their deposits held
with commercial banks and from government bond holdings. Real dispos-
able income of this group of households increase by around 10 percent in the
medium run and 6 percent in the long run (see, again, Table 3).
The bond rate increases strongly until period 5. Most of the upward
pressure on the bond rate results from the fact that the increase in deposit
rates tends to reduce the demand for bonds by proﬁt earners; the net worth
of commercial banks remain low through the medium run (making them
55therefore reluctant to increase bond holdings above direct placement hold-
ings), and central bank holdings are exogenous. Given that the supply of
bonds does not change across experiments, the bond rate must increase to
maintain market equilibrium and maintain bond holdings of proﬁte a r n e r s
around baserun levels.45 The impact on the bond rate reaches a maximum
of 11 percentage points in period 5, after which increases in the net worth
of commercial banks start to kick in. The bond rate therefore increases less
strongly after that period, by about 6 percentage points in the long run.
Banks’ net worth is negatively aﬀected by the increasing cost of central
bank funding. However, it is positively aﬀected by the increase in the bond
and lending rates. The lending rate on domestic-currency loans increases
by 4.8 percent in the short run and 4.5 percent in the medium run. This
reﬂects the countering eﬀects of a) the initial increase in the oﬃcial rate of 5
percent; anda) the subsequent reductions in the expected rate of depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate and a slight fall in the domestic premium.
Declining expectations of nominal depreciation follow from a general decline
in actual exchange rate depreciation. This aﬀects the cost of funding through
foreign-currency deposits and therefore lowers the lending rate. The domestic
premium also declines slightly due to the exchange rate appreciation, which
lowers the domestic-currency value of ﬁrms’ foreign liabilities and therefore
increases the value of their net collateral-debt ratio.
The nominal exchange rate appreciates by around 10 percent in the
medium run, and 6 percent in the long run. The growth path of the nom-
inal exchange rate closely resembles the growth path of the domestic price
level, and this is reﬂected in a relatively stable real exchange rate. Indeed,
the real exchange rate depreciates by about 0.3 percent in the short run and
appreciates by about 0. 5 percent in the medium run, before settling down
to a real appreciation of only 0.1 percent in the long run. Movements in the
real exchange rate are mirrored in the trade balance and the current account,
w h i c hi m p r o v e si nt h es h o r tr u nb u td e t e r i o r a t e ss l i g h t l yi nt h em e d i u ma n d
long run.
As noted earlier, the increase in lending rates induced by the hike in
oﬃcial interest rates aﬀects the real economy through two main channels: a)
reduced investment demand; and b) increased costs of working capital. The
45This is so despite the fact that savings by proﬁt earners tend to increase as a result of
the rise in deposit rates–an increase that tends to raises total ﬁnancial wealth over time
(as implied by (64)) and thus to increase the demand for bonds (as implied by (76)).
56ﬁrst channel directly reduces demand for private formal sector investment
goods. Combined with the reduction in formal sector disposable income and
consumption, this leads to a sharp reduction in demand for private formal
sector goods compared to other sectors of the economy. In addition, the
medium and long run impact of lower investment (or more accurately, the
reduction in the stock of private physical capital that it entails) is to lower
production capacity and reduce the marginal product of other production
factors (most notably skilled labor) in the private formal sector. Value added
in the urban formal sector is therefore particularly aﬀected and declines by
0.8 percent in the long run. The urban informal sector also experiences a
small decline in value added of less than 0.1 percent in the long run, whereas
value added in the rural sector expands by 0.2 percent. These developments
are mainly due to relative price eﬀects and the reduced outﬂow of workers
from rural to urban areas. Overall, GDP declines by 0.3 percent in the long
run.
The decline in real GDP is the outcome of the decline in private in-
vestment demand dominating the real increase in consumption. Over time,
private investment declines strongly not only as a result of the increasing
lending rate but also because of the negative accelerator eﬀect emanating
from the decline in GDP itself. In contrast, private consumption increases
due to the income eﬀect (alluded to above) of the increase in the deposit and
bond rates, particularly on the disposable income of proﬁte a r n e r s . C o m -
bined with a decline in relative formal sector prices, this leads to a sharp
increase in real consumption of that category of households. The increase
in overall real household consumption is moderated by the decline in dispos-
able income and consumption by the formal sector household, for the reasons
discussed earlier.
Wages in the labor market generally mirror changes in the overall price
level. Fully indexed public sector wages move (downward) with the urban
formal sector consumer price index. In addition, lower public sector wages
(through their signaling eﬀect), together with higher lending rates, higher
(skilled) unemployment, and declining private sector investment, combine
to lower relative wages in the formal private sector. The decline in formal
sector wages spills over into declines in rural and informal sector wages as
well. The former fall by more, implying that the expected wage diﬀerential
between the formal and informal urban sectors drops by about 8 percentage
points in the medium run (periods 4 and 5 in Table 2) and 4 percentage
points in the long run, whereas the wage diﬀerential between the rural and
57urban sectors drops by about 3 percentage points in the medium run and 0.3
percentage point in the long run. Movements in these wage diﬀerentials lead
to reduced migration of labor between sectors, and account for the increase
in employment and value added in the rural sector, and the drop in both
variables in the informal sector.
The external premium faced by domestic banks (as shown in (92)) ﬂuc-
tuates essentially with changes in exports. The initial exchange rate depreci-
ation increases exports. The fall in the ratio of foreign debt (which does not
change across simulations) to exports therefore lowers the external premium
in the short run. The subsequent exchange rate appreciation and associated
reduction in exports means, however, that the external premium increases
in the long run. This leads to a higher interest rate on foreign-currency
deposits held domestically (as implied by (90) and (91)), as well as higher
rates charged on domestic- and foreign-currency loans by domestic banks (as
implied by (91), (93), and (95)). In principle, the eﬀect of interest rates on
foreign-currency deposits and loans could be signiﬁcant. For instance, the
increase in interest rates on foreign-currency loans raises interest payments
for ﬁrms in the private formal sector (which reduces income distributed to
proﬁte a r n e r sa n dt h u sd a m p e n st h ei n c r e a s ei nt h a tg r o u p ’ sc o n s u m p t i o n
expenditure); at the same time, it raises banks’ proﬁts and thus income re-
ceived by proﬁt earners. However, because these eﬀects tend to oﬀset each
other, and because the quantity of domestic loans denominated in foreign
currency is relatively small, the net quantitative impact is not large.
The probability of government default increases due to the reduction in
nominal tax revenues and the resulting increase in the debt-to-tax revenues
ratio.46 This increase in the default probability is matched by a similar
decline in credibility, due to increased expectations of monetization or out-
right default. As a result, the bond rate tends to rise (compounding the de-
mand eﬀects discussed earlier) and expectations of inﬂation tend to increase.
Over time, the rise in expected inﬂation tends to mitigate the positive impact
of the rise in deposit rates on households’ savings rates (see equation (62)).
For private investment, by contrast, the rise in expected inﬂation tends to
reduce the initial magnitude of the increase in the real lending rate, thereby
dampening over time the adverse eﬀect of a higher cost of borrowing on
46Note that in Table 2 the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP increases throughout the
simulation period. This is because, although both variables fall, the reduction in GDP
exceeds that of tax revenues.
58private capital formation.
Finally, it can be noticed that the government primary surplus-to-GDP
ratio increases both in the short and the long run. The increase reaches a
maximum of 5.6 percentage points over the reference path (Table 2, period
5), reﬂecting a sharp decline in government transfers to households. These
transfers are squeezed due to the strong increase in the bond interest pay-
ments resulting from our assumption that bond ﬁnancing is maintained at
baserun levels, implying that (with exogenous foreign borrowing in foreign-
currency terms) the government deﬁcit is given from “below the line.”
It is worth noting that the magnitude of the long-run decline in GDP
would of course be smaller if, as a result of a Taylor-type rule, the author-
ities were to lower interest rates in response to lower inﬂation. It is also
interesting to note that this experiment, a disinﬂation attempt based on a
rise in oﬃcial interest rates, leads to a rise in the probability of default (es-
sentially because the increase in interest rates has a contractionary eﬀect,
which translates into lower tax revenues), and an initial real depreciation
(see Table 3). These results are consistent with those derived by Blanchard
(2004) in a very diﬀerent setting, characterized by a direct link between the
probability of default, capital ﬂows, and movements in the exchange rate.
Nevertheless, our experiment carries a similar note of caution: in an inﬂation
targeting framework (in which interest rates are used to achieve a speciﬁc
level of inﬂation), an initial inﬂationary shock can have perverse eﬀects. An
increase in real interest rates to “choke oﬀ”i n ﬂationary pressures can lead
to a real depreciation, and thus higher inﬂation, which may lead in turn to
further increases in interest rates. In our experiment, ﬁscal policy is also an
important potential tool to reduce inﬂation: by issuing less domestic debt
and reducing the debt-to-tax ratio, the government would mitigate the in-
crease in the probability of default, which would in turn dampen the rise
in the bond rate. This would reduce pressure on cutting the primary deﬁcit
through a drop in transfers, thereby dampening the adverse eﬀect on activity
and tax revenues.
4.2 Fiscal Adjustment
As noted earlier, we discuss two types of ﬁscal adjustment policies: an increase
in the VAT rate and a rise in the tax rate on income of proﬁte a r n e r s .
594.2.1 Increase in the VAT Rate
We ﬁrst consider ﬁscal adjustment in the form of a permanent, 2.5 percentage
point increase in the value added tax, which (as noted earlier) applies solely
to private formal sector goods. Results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
The increase in the tax rate raises both the level and the growth rate of
prices. Overall inﬂation rises by about 3.6 percent in the short and medium
run (see Table 4, period 4). The inﬂationary impact becomes negative af-
ter period 6, before returning to slightly positive values in the long run. In
level terms, prices increase by about 15 percent above their baserun value in
the long run. This general increase is driven by changes in relative demand
and supply of goods and services. First, the tax hike leads directly to an
increase in the price of the private formal sector good. This tends to lower
demand for that good, lowering production and increasing unemployment
(particularly among the unskilled) in the formal sector. At the same time,
the increase in government revenues is transferred back to households, due to
the public sector closure rule; this tends to stimulate consumption spending
across all categories of goods and to put further upward pressure on prices.
Furthermore, the bond rate declines markedly, thereby lowering interest pay-
ments and borrowing needs by the government, and reinforcing the increase
in demand through higher household transfers (which increase by about 3.4
percent of GDP in the long run). Reduced investment demand for formal
sector goods pulls in the other direction. Investment is negatively aﬀected by
increasing lending rates and the “reverse” accelerator eﬀect associated with
a decline in the growth rate of GDP. However, improved credibility (through
its eﬀect on inﬂation expectations and the real lending rate, as discussed
later) reduces the impact of this eﬀect in the medium and long run.
The bond rate declines by less than 1 percentage point on impact and
reaches a maximum reduction of 8 percentage points in the medium run (see
T a b l e4 ,p e r i o d5 ) .I nt h el o n gr u n ,i td e c l i n e sb ya b o u t6p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s .
This decline results essentially from the increase in the nominal disposable
income of proﬁt earners. While these households experience a strong drop in
real disposable income due to falling commercial bank proﬁts (see Table 5),
the impact of inﬂation on nominal income, and thus savings and wealth, is
such that the nominal demand for bond holdings increases. With the supply
of bonds exogenously ﬁx e d ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nd e m a n dt e n d st ol o w e rb o n dr a t e s .
The smaller long-run decline in the bond rate is due to movements in the net
worth of commercial banks. Indeed, the declining bond rate exerts over time
60a self-correcting feedback eﬀect through lower commercial banks’ proﬁts and
net worth. This lowers the overall demand for bonds and creates pressure
for a (partial) long-run correction in the drop in the bond rate.
Banks’ net worth is also aﬀected by a slight increase in the interest rate on
domestic-currency loans, of the order of 0.3 percentage point in the long run.
This increase follows mainly from a rise in the domestic premium, which
results in turn from actual exchange rate depreciation: by increasing the
domestic-currency value of foreign-currency loans, the nominal depreciation
reduces the net value of ﬁrms’ collateral. At the same time, expectations
of exchange rate depreciation remain relatively unchanged. The reason is
t h a tt h eh i g h e ra c t u a lr a t eo fe x c h a n g er a t ed e p r e c i a t i o ni sm i t i g a t e db y
lower expected inﬂation in the long run, due to improved credibility and
declining inﬂation in the long run. In turn, credibility improves because in-
creasing (nominal) tax revenues lower the debt-to-tax ratio, thereby lowering
the probability of default. In turn, the reduction in the probability of default
(that is, the credibility gain) tends to lower the actual bond rate, thereby
contributing to the decline discussed earlier.
The nominal exchange rate depreciates by around 13 percent in the
medium run and 10 percent in the long run. The growth path of the nom-
inal exchange rate resembles the growth path of the domestic price level,
but less so than in the case of an increase in the oﬃcial interest rate (as
discussed earlier). Accordingly, the real exchange rate tends to appreciate,
remaining around 0.5 percent below the baserun level in the long run (see
Table 5). Nevertheless, both the trade balance and the current account tend
to improve in the long run. This occurs both because of the decline in real
total consumption induced by the fall in disposable income (which reduces
overall spending on the composite private formal sector good) and because
the relative price of private formal sector goods declines strongly–in spite
of the increase in the tax rate. Combined with strong nominal depreciation,
this leads to a decline in the relative demand for imports of the private good
and (despite an appreciation of the “overall” real exchange rate) a slight
improvement in the current account in the long run.
The combination of an increasing lending rate and tax-induced increases
in the price of formal sector investment goods leads to a strong reduction in
investment demand initially. In the short run, increased expectations of in-
ﬂation due to high actual inﬂation reduce the cost of borrowing, which tends
to mitigate the fall in investment demand over the medium run. However,
improved credibility and declining actual inﬂation lead to lower expected in-
61ﬂation in the long run, pushing the real cost of borrowing back up. The
increase in the (expected) real lending rate, combined with a negative accel-
erator eﬀect, tend to reduce real private investment again, by 3.6 percent in
the long run. Over time, lower levels of investment lead to lower production
capacity and a reduction in the marginal product of other production factors
in the private formal sector. The general decline in demand for formal sector
goods therefore leads to a sharp long-run reduction in unskilled employment,
of about 4.3 percent, whereas skilled employment drops by about 0.2 per-
cent. As a consequence, value added in the urban formal sector declines by
0.8 percent in the long run. Urban informal sector value added also declines
by 0.3 percent, whereas value added in the rural sector improves by about
0.6 percent in the long run. Increasing value added in the rural sector and
reduced value added in the urban informal sector result mainly from lower
migration of workers from rural to urban areas, itself reﬂecting movements
in wage diﬀerentials. Overall, GDP declines by 0.3 percent in the long run.
The decline in real GDP mainly reﬂects the diverging growth paths of
components of aggregate demand. While private investment demand declines
strongly at ﬁrst, recovers somewhat, and starts declining again, real private
consumption remains relatively unchanged in the long run; it experiences an
initial short-run expansion of 0.4 percent, followed by a medium-run contrac-
tion of the same magnitude. These movements reﬂect the behavior of the
real disposable income of proﬁt earners, which declines strongly by 11 per-
cent in the medium run and by 9 percent in the long run. In turn, as noted
earlier, the declining income of proﬁt earners is mainly due to the sharp drop
in interest income from bond holdings.
Over time, declining real investment tends to reduce the capital stock in
the private formal sector–and therefore the demand for skilled labor, given
the high degree of complementarity between these factors. Combined with
reduced demand for formal sector goods, this leads to a reduction in skilled
employment, but only by a moderate amount in the long run (0.2 percent). In
contrast, the long-run reduction in unskilled employment amounts to 4.3 per-
cent, indicating that bargained wages for unskilled workers are increasing too
fast. Partly because of the marked increase in formal sector unemployment,
t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between formal and informal sector declines strongly.
This (together with a reduction in the probability of ﬁnding a job in the pri-
vate formal sector) implies that migration toward the formal sector is reversed
in the long run. Nevertheless, the reduced level of formal sector migration
cannot fully compensate for reduced employment in that sector. Unskilled
62open unemployment therefore increases by 1.4 percent in the long run. By
contrast, skilled unemployment increases by a much smaller proportion (0.1
percent) at the same horizon.
Finally, the results indicate that the hike in the tax rate leads to a sharp
increase (by 11 percent) in the ratio of tax revenues to domestic debt in the
long run. This is partly due to the direct impact of an increased VAT rate,
but mostly due to the impact of higher prices on tax revenues. Combined
with the strong decline in the bond rate, this leads to a signiﬁcant long-run
reduction in the interest payments-to-tax revenue ratio. Furthermore, the
reduced interest payments implies that there is less need for a government
primary surplus. Accordingly, the reduction in interest payments leads to
increased household transfers (and thus higher spending, as noted earlier)
and a long-run reduction in the primary surplus of around 2.4 percent of
GDP.
4.2.2 Increase in the Tax Rate on ProﬁtE a r n e r s
We next consider a permanent, 5 percent a g ep o i n ti n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t e
on income of proﬁt earners. Results are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
The main impact of the tax increase is to lower real disposable income
of proﬁt earners (by about 3.2-3.8 percent in the short and long run) and
to increase real disposable income of other urban sector households. It also
leads to an in increase in government revenues amounting to 1 percent of
GDP in the short to medium run, and 1.2 percent of GDP in the long run.
As a result of our public budget closure rule (which, again, keeps the
supply of bonds ﬁxed and treats foreign borrowing as exogenous), the in-
crease in government revenue translates into higher transfers to households.
Given the initial distribution of these transfers, they go mainly toward urban
formal households and proﬁt earners. Nevertheless, urban informal house-
holds are initially the main beneﬁciaries of the increased transfers, with their
real disposable income rising by 2.0 percent in the short run, compared to
0.9 percent for urban formal households and -0.2 percent for rural house-
h o l d s . T h es t r o n gr e l a t i v ei n c r e a s ei ni n f o r m a ls e c t o ri n c o m ei sd u et oa)
increasing demand for informal sector goods and production input (labor);
and b) the fact that informal sector households are not subject to direct tax
payments. Proﬁt earners have relatively low consumption shares in informal
sector goods. The redistribution of household income therefore increases de-
mand for informal sector goods by a relatively large amount. In turn, this
63raises informal sector output, labor demand, and wages, thereby leading to
higher real disposable income.
In the medium run (period 5), formal sector households enjoy a relatively
strong increase in real disposable income (2.9 percent) compared to urban
informal households (1.9 percent). The income of proﬁt earners is relatively
high in the medium run, and tax-induced redistribution toward formal sector
households is therefore relatively high. In the long run, the initial pattern re-
establishes itself: urban informal households gain the most (about 2 percent)
compared to urban formal households (1 percent) and rural households (-0.3
percent).
Inﬂa t i o ni sh i g hi nt h es h o r tr u nb u td e c l i n e st o w a r dz e r oi nt h em e d i u m
run. Rural and urban price levels reach a maximum increase of 3.1-3.4 per-
cent (see Table 7, period 5). In subsequent periods, inﬂation turns negative
and price levels return gradually to values close to their baserun levels. Price
movements are driven by the increase in sectoral demand (relative to supply)
f o rg o o d sa n ds e r v i c e sa n dt e n dt ob er e ﬂected in movements of the nominal
exchange rate. The real exchange rate appreciates somewhat in the short and
medium run, but remains virtually unchanged in the long run. The initial
exchange rate appreciation worsens thec u r r e n ta c c o u n ts l i g h t l yi nt h es h o r t
run. In the longer run, however, there is no discernible impact on external
balance.
Similar to price levels, nominal wage levels reach a maximum increase in
the medium run. High wage increases of about 5.5 percent are experienced by
informal sector workers. In comparison, private formal skilled and unskilled
workers beneﬁt from smaller increases, of the order of 1.5 and 2.3 percent,
respectively. In the long run, the informal sector wage level increases by
2.7 percent whereas formal sector wages (both skilled and unskilled) decline.
T h i sd e c l i n ei sd u et oac o m b i n e ds w i t c hi nc o n s u m p t i o na n di n v e s t m e n t
demand away from formal sector goods. The fall in unskilled wages in the
formal private sector is somewhat mitigated in the medium and long run
as a result of an increase in the reservation wage due to increasing public
sector wages (private formal unskilled workers beneﬁt from a high public
sector leadership eﬀect on their wages), and subsequently due to declining
unskilled unemployment.
The long-run decline in unskilled unemployment (following an increase
in the short and medium run) results mainly from a reduction in the supply
of unskilled labor to the formal sector. The reason is that the increase in
the informal sector wage relative to the private formal unskilled wage lowers
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reduces migration into the formal sector (and thus the number of unskilled
job seekers in that sector) and gradually eliminates the increase in unemploy-
ment that occurred during the short and medium run. As for rural-urban
migration, the expected wage diﬀerential between urban and rural areas gets
smaller relative to the baseline, because of the decline in relative formal sector
wages (and in spite of the increase in informal sector wages). The subsequent
“reverse” migration from urban to rural areas implies that informal sector
employment contracts slightly in the medium run; it also expands in the long
run, when migration out of urban areas tapers oﬀ. Labor movements imply
that rural employment continuously expands during the simulation horizon.
Unskilled employment in the urban formal sector declines both in the
short and the long run, as a result of declining demand for formal sector
goods. Skilled employment also declines (marginally) in the short run, but
increases (marginally) in the medium term due to increasing investment and
capital accumulation. As noted earlier, skilled workers beneﬁtf r o mt h ec o m -
plementarity between physical capital accumulation and skilled labor employ-
ment. But because the increases in real private investment recorded between
periods 2 and 6 are subsequently reversed (see below), this complementarity
eﬀect is muted. Skilled employment remain essentially unchanged in the long
run.
Overall, the redistributive policy of increasing taxation of proﬁte a r n e r s
leaves real GDP unchanged in the long run. Migration increases employment
and real value added in rural areas by a small amount (0.1 percent). By
contrast, reduced demand for formal sector goods leads to reduced relative
formal sector wages, reduced formal sector migration, and lower value added
in the formal sector (-0.1 percent). The net eﬀect of increased migration to
rural areas and reduced formal sector migration means that value added in
the informal sector remains virtually unchanged in the long run.
Real investment declines on impact due to the accelerator eﬀect. During
the following periods (and until period 6), real investment expands because
increasing inﬂationary expectations reduce the expected cost of borrowing
for investment purposes. By the same token, real investment declines in the
l o n gr u na se x p e c t e di n ﬂation and the expected cost of borrowing drop. Real
consumption falls in line with disposable income, whereas overall disposable
income itself declines due to increasing consumer prices.
Regarding the ﬁnancial sector, the interest rate on domestic-currency
loans increases marginally in the medium run, and declines slightly in the
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and external risk premia, whereas the long-run decline follows from improved
credibility, which spills over into declining expectations of inﬂation and ex-
change rate depreciation–thereby lowering the expected cost of funds. Im-
proved credibility is the mirror image of a declining probability of default,
which itself follows directly from the increase in tax revenues. The reduction
in the probability of default puts downward pressure on the actual bond rate.
Overall, however, the bond rate increases in both the short and the long run,
as a result of a decline in the demand for bonds by proﬁt earners, induced by
lower disposable income, lower savings, and thus lower wealth accumulation
over time for that category of households. In between, during the medium
run, the bond rate declines slightly because of a wealth-induced increase in
demand for government bonds by commercial banks. Nominal exchange rate
depreciation increases the net worth of commercial banks in the medium run,
and this indeed stimulates their demand for bonds.
Public ﬁnance indicators show that tax revenues expand signiﬁcantly as
a proportion of domestic debt throughout the adjustment period, reaching
2.4 percent in the long run. The increase in government resources implies
that interest payments as a proportion of tax revenues decline strongly dur-
ing the medium term. However, the subsequent increase in the bond rate
implies that the interest payments-tax revenue ratio returns to a value close
to its baserun level in the long run. Due to the model closure rule (ﬂexible
household transfers balancing the public sector budget), the primary budget
surplus naturally reﬂects additional ﬁnancing needs. Accordingly, the pri-
mary budget balance follows movements in the bond rate: as a proportion
of GDP, the primary surplus deteriorates in the medium term, and improves
(by about 0.7 percentage point) in the long run.
Finally, in evaluating the ﬁscal eﬀects of a tax increase on proﬁte a r n e r s ,
it should be kept in mind that the model does not account for the possibility
that higher tax rates may increase incentives for tax evasion (thereby reduc-
ing the increase in the “eﬀective” tax rate) and/or reduce incentives to par-
ticipate in the labor force (which would aﬀect output growth in the medium
and long run). Both eﬀects may lead to lower increases in tax revenues than
those indicated by our simulation results. At the same time, however, there
is limited evidence that participation rates are highly sensitive to tax rates
in Turkey.
665C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the eﬀects of monetary and
ﬁscal adjustment on public debt sustainability and the behavior of wages and
unemployment in Turkey. The model on which the analysis is based captures
a number of important structural characteristics of the Turkish economy, such
as rural-urban migration, a large urban informal sector, bilateral bargaining
in the formal sector, dollarization of the banking system (on both asset and
liability sides), as well as the interactions between credibility, default risk
on government debt, and inﬂation expectations. Accounting for default risk
on public debt is indeed a key feature of the model, despite its determin-
istic nature. Our basic assumption is that if the government must engage
in large-scale borrowing to meet its debt service payments and ﬁnance its
deﬁcit, investors will be unwilling to accumulate public bonds indeﬁnitely.
We endogenized investors’ behavior by assuming that there is a non-zero
perceived probability of default that depends on the debt-to-tax revenue ra-
tio. The higher the perceived risk of default is, the lower will be the degree
of credibility of the ﬁscal stance. Lower credibility, in turn, translates into
greater inﬂation persistence and upward pressure on interest rates on govern-
ment bonds. Thus, an unsustainable ﬁscal policy may force the government
to adjust, as a result of growing pressure on borrowing costs.
Various simulations were performed. Speciﬁcally, we conducted two sets
of experiments: a restrictive monetary policy taking the form of a permanent
increase in oﬃcial interest rates, and ﬁscal adjustment, taking the form of an
i n c r e a s ei nt h eV A Tr a t ea n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t eo ni n c o m eo fp r o ﬁt
earners. The results highlighted the importance of accounting for general
equilibrium eﬀects in interest rate determination, as well as the link between
default risk and credibility in understanding the real and ﬁnancial eﬀects
of adjustment policies. In addition, they also indicated the importance of
a broad range of ﬁscal measures for putting domestic public debt on a sus-
tainable path. These results are consistent with those of several other recent
studies of the Turkish economy. For instance, Voyvoda and Yeldan (2003),
using an overlapping-generations framework, found that whether the primary
surplus target of 6.5 percent of GDP embedded in the May 2001 program
is sustainable depended heavily on the vulnerability of the Turkish economy
to adverse growth shocks. In addition, the debt-to-GDP ratio was likely to
fall only gradually. They called for further ﬁscal reform to ensure a speed-
ier fall in that ratio–and therefore allow domestic risk premia (or default
67probabilities) to fall and interest rates to come down, as in our framework.
As one would naturally expect in a model of this type, our simulation
results depend very much on the type of closure rule that we adopted for the
government budget. Instead of assuming that the supply of bonds follows
an exogenous path and that any residual budget gap is “closed” through an
adjustment in transfers to households–a plausible adjustment scenario for
a country where the recent crisis has led to a dramatic drop in real wages
and a sharp increase in poverty–we could have assumed for instance that
the supply of domestic bonds (or foreign borrowing) is endogenous, with an
adjustment rule involving either a change in government spending on goods
and services produced in the formal sector, or a change in the VAT tax rate,
when the ratio of domestic (or foreign) debt to tax revenues reaches a partic-
ular level. Such threshold rules are attractive from an empirical standpoint
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e yd e s c r i b eq u i t ew e l lt h ew a yp o l i c y m a k e r st e n dt or e -
spond to excessive growth in their liabilities. Intuitively, the implications for
our model are quite clear: by allowing the debt-to-tax ratio to ﬂuctuate a lot
more, the probability of default would also ﬂuctuate more, thereby implying
al a r g e re ﬀect of default risk (or, equivalently here, credibility) on the actual
bond rate. In turn, ﬂuctuations in the bond rate would imply larger eﬀects
of any given shock on the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy.
In addition to the policies considered in this paper, the model can be
used to analyze the ﬁscal and labor market eﬀects of a wide range of shocks.
For instance, the model could be used to study the impact of various interest
rate rules on output, inﬂation, and unemployment, or alternative ﬁscal rules
aimed at limiting discretion in spending and ensuring public debt sustain-
ability in the long run (see, for instance, Perry (2003) and Wyplosz (2002)).
An analysis of the performance of alternative interest rate rules–which could
capitalize on some of the recent research by Berument and Malatyali (2001),
Berument and Tasci (2004), and Elekdag (2003)–would be particularly de-
sirable, given Turkey’s planned transition to inﬂation targeting. The response
of Turkey’s economy to various types of external shocks (such as contagion
eﬀects, autonomous changes in sentiment on world capital markets, as in
Agénor (2005b), or terms-of-trade disturbances) could also be analyzed in
the model.
On the labor market side, an important experiment would be to exam-
ine the impact of a cut in payroll taxation. Employer-paid social security
contributions averaged about 36 percent of total labor costs during 1996-
2000; it has been argued that these high social security taxes create strong
68disincentives to job creation. More generally, many observers have called
for a thorough overhaul of Turkey’s social insurance system. A key issue in
this context is how to shift the main pillar of unemployment protection from
the severance payment system to the unemployment insurance scheme es-
tablished in June 2000, and the extent to which this shift will promote labor
adjustment in response to changing economic conditions.47 The model could
also be used to analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of a reduction in employ-
ment of unskilled workers in government. This last simulation is quite impor-
tant because some observers have argued that continued ﬁscal adjustment in
Turkey may require a sustained retrenchment in public sector employment,
given a public sector wage bill that accounted for about 24 percent of central
government expenditure in recent years.48
Finally, although already quite complex, our model can be extended or
modiﬁed in various directions. We assumed that the market for bank credit
was imperfectly competitive. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the
banking system is oligopolistic, as for instance in Beenstock et al. (2003).
This type of market structure could lead to higher, and more rigid, bank
lending spreads. Second, workers’ reservation wage could be made a function
of severance payments, as for instance in Agénor’s (2003) speciﬁcation of the
wage target of trade unions. This would allow the model to address an
important issue for the Turkish labor market (see Tunali (2003)): the wage
and employment eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs. Finally, we did not
model the stock market. Although the existing evidence suggests that the
stock market does not play a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial role in Turkey at the present
time, its importance may increase in the future–and so will, therefore, its
potential eﬀects on private investment and portfolio allocation.
47Social security could be modeled along the lines of Agénor, Nabli, Yousef, and Jensen
(2004).
48During the period 1999-2001, public sector employment increased by 5 percent,
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49In both Appendices A and B, the index i or j (respectively, h)i su s e db e l o wt or e f e r
to all production sectors (household groups, respectively), that is, A, G, I,a n dP (A, I,































RUR = URUR,−1(1 + gRUR) − MIG (A15)

















WjG = ωjGPURB,j = U,S (A19)
WSP =( 1− νS)ΩS +
νSPJ1mS
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S =( 1− δS)S−1 + SKL (A34)
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AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
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PROFITS AND INCOME
PROFi = PViVi − WiUi, for i = A,I (A49)
PROFP = PVPVP −(1+IL−1)[(1+paytaxU)WMUP +(1+paytaxS)WSSP]
(A50)
YF P =( 1 −ftaxP)PROF P−IL−1DLP,−1−ILF−1DLFP,−1−IF
W·ER·FLP,−1
(A51)
PROFG = PVGVG − (1 + paytaxU)WUGUG − (1 + paytaxS)WSGSG (A52)
PROFB = IL−1(DLP,−1 + DLF,−1)+ILF−1DLFP,−1 (A53)











YH A = WAUA + shpAPROF A + γATRH+ ID· DDA,−1 (A54)
YH I = PVIVI + γITRH+ ID· DDI,−1 + τIER· REMIT (A55)
















−IL−1DLF,−1 +( 1− τI)ER· REMIT
YH E =( 1− shpA)PROF A + shp
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CONh =( 1− inctaxh)YH h − SAVh (A60)































PK −1 · ZP,−1
NGDP−2
) (A63)
KP = KP,−1(1 − δP)+ZP,−1 (A64)
CREDIT MARKET AND PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION
WT h = Hh + ER(FDh + FD
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DDh = WT h − Hh,h = A,I (A69)
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P = DLP + ER· DLFP (A73)
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DLP,−1 + ER−1(DLFP,−1 + FLP,−1)
¸−κDRP
(A89)
(1 + ILF)(1 + EDEPR)=1+IL (A90)
CENTRAL BANK
PROF CB = IR· DLB,−1 + IF
W
RFER· FF + IB· GBCB,−1 (A91)
NWCB = NWCB,−1 +( 1− shpG)PROFCB + ∆ER· FF −1 (A92)
MB = MB−1+∆DLB+ER·∆FF+∆GBCB−(1−shpG)PROFCB (A93)
GOVERNMENT
PRBAL= TXREV + PROF G + shpGPROFCB (A94)
−WSGS
E
G − TRH− PG· G − PC PZG
OVBAL = PRBAL− IF
W






B + GBCB + GBE (A96)


























ZG = IINF + IEDU (A100)
Ki =( 1− δi)Ki,−1 + Ii,−1,i = INF,EDU (A101)
−OVBAL = ER· ∆FL G + ∆GB
s (A102)





























REMIT = κREMWFFORL −1 (A104)
FORL=( 1− δIMIG)FORL −1 + IMIG (A105)
CURRENCY AND BOND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
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PE i = wpeiER, i = A,P (A110)
PM i = wpmi(1 + tmi)ER, i = A,P (A111)
PXi =
PD iDi + PE iEi
Xi
,i = A,P (A112)
PX i = PD i,i = I,G (A113)
PQi =
PDiDi + PM iMi
Qi
,i = A,P (A114)
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PINF = INFL= ∆CPI/CPI−1 (A123)
DEFAULT RISK, CREDIBILITY, AND EXPECTATIONS





EINFL = CREDIB · INFL
TARG+( 1− CREDIB)INFL−1 (A126)
CREDIB =1− PDEF (A127)
EDEPR = χEDEPR−1 +( 1− χ)(EINFL− FINFL −1) (A128)
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Variable Names and Deﬁnitions
Endogenous Variables
Name Deﬁnition
Cih Consumption of good i by household category h
Ci Aggregate consumption of good i
CONh Consumption by household category h
CPI Aggregate price level
CREDIB Credibility index
DA Domestic demand for domestic rural good
DDA Domestic deposits by households in rural sector
DDE Domestic deposits by proﬁt earners and capitalists
DDF Domestic deposits by households in the formal sector
DDI Domestic deposits by households in the informal sector
DDS Domestic deposits by skilled household
DDUF Domestic deposits by unskilled household in formal sector
DDUI Domestic deposits by households in the informal sector
DEF Government deﬁcit
DIRTAX Direct tax revenue
DLB Borrowing from the central bank
DLF Borrowing abroad from commercial banks
DLFP Foreign-currency loans by domestic banks
DLP Domestic-currency loans by banks to formal ﬁrms
DLT
P Total domestic borrowing from commercial banks
DOMPR Domestic risk premium
DP Domestic demand for domestic private urban good
EA Export of rural sector goods
EP Export of private urban (formal) good
EDEPR Expected rate of depreciation of nominal exchange rate
EIB Expected rate of return on government bonds
EINFL Expected inﬂation rate
EXTPR External risk premium
EWF Expected foreign wage, in domestic-currency terms
EWURB Expected unskilled urban wage,
FDA Foreign deposits by households in rural sector
79FDE Foreign deposits by proﬁt earners and capitalists
FDF Foreign-currency deposits held at home by formal household
FDW
h Foreign-currency deposits held abroad by household h
FDS Foreign deposits by skilled household
FDUF Foreign deposits by households in formal urban sector
FDUI Foreign deposits by households in informal sector
FF Foreign reserves
FLB Banks’ foreign liabilities
FLG Foreign loans made to the government
FORL Number of Turkish nationals working abroad
G Government expenditures
GA Government spending on rural sector good
GG Government spending on public sector good
GP Government spending in private urban sector good
GB Government bonds held by commercial banks, the central
bank, and proﬁte a r n e r s
GBCB Government bonds held by the central bank
GBE Holdings of government bonds, proﬁt earners/capitalists
GBh holdings of government bonds by household h
GBB Holdings of government bonds, commercial banks
GBs Supply of government bonds
GBT
B Total government bond holdings by commercial banks
GBd
B Additional commercial bank demand for government bonds
GB
p
B Direct bond placements by commercial banks
GBd
E Demand for government bonds by proﬁte a r n e r s
Hd Total demand for money
Hd
h D e m a n df o rc u r r e n c yb yh o u s e h o l dh
Hs Money supply
HA Money held by households in rural sector
HE M o n e yh e l db yp r o ﬁte a r n e r s
HS Money held by skilled household
HUF Money held by households in formal urban sector
HUI Money held by households in informal sector
IB Rate of interest on public bonds
INDTAX Indirect taxes on goods and services
IR Cost of funds provided by the central bank
IL Interest rate for domestic loan
80IMIG Migration to foreign countries
INDTAX Indirect taxes on goods and services
INFL Consumer price index inﬂation rate
INFLTARG Inﬂation target of the central bank
INTA Intermediate good demand for rural sector good
INTI Intermediate good demand for informal good
INTP Intermediate good demand for formal private sector good
INTG Intermediate good demand for public good
J1 Composite input from J2 and unskilled labor
J2 Composite input from physical capital and skilled labor
JG Composite input from skilled labor and public capital
in infrastructure
KEDU Public capital in education
KINF Public capital in infrastructure
KP Private capital
MA Import of rural sector good
MB Money base
MIG Net of worker migration to urban areas
MP Import of private urban (formal) good
mS Physical marginal product of skilled worker
mU Physical marginal product of unskilled worker
NGDP Nominal GDP at market prices
NWB Net worth of commercial banks
NWCB Net worth of the central bank
ΩS,ΩU Reservation wages of skilled and unskilled workers
OVBAL Overall ﬁscal balance
PRUR Rural price index
PC i Sales price of good i
PD A Price of domestic sales of rural sector good
PURB Urban consumption price index
PD G Domestic price of public good
PD I Domestic price of informal sector good
PD P Domestic price of domestic sales of private urban good
PDEF Probability of default on government debt
PE A Price of exported rural good
PE P Price of exported private urban good
PG Government consumption deﬂator
81PINF Inﬂation rate
PJ 1 Price of composite input J1
PJ2 Price of composite input J2
PK Price of capital
PM A Price of imported rural sector good
PM P Price of imported private urban sector good
PQ A Composite good price of rural sector good
PQ G Composite good price of public good
PQ I Composite good price of informal sector good
PQ P Composite good price of private urban sector good
PRBAL Government primary balance
PROFA Proﬁts from rural production
PROFB Commercial banks’ proﬁts
PROFG Proﬁts from public production
PROFI Proﬁts from informal sector production
PROFP Proﬁts from private urban formal production
PROFCB Proﬁts of the central bank
PV A Value added price of rural sector good
PV I Value added price of informal good
PV P Value added price of private formal good
PV G Value added price of rural sector good
PX A Sales price of agricultural good
PX G Sales price of public good
PX I Sales price of informal good
PX P Sales price of private urban (formal) good
QA Demand of nontraded agricultural composite good
QG Demand of public composite good
QI Demand of informal composite good
QP Demand of private urban composite good
Qd
A Aggregate demand for rural sector good
Qd
G Aggregate demand for public good
Qd
I Aggregate demand for informal good
Qd
P Aggregate demand for urban private formal sector good
Qs
A Quantity supplied in the rural sector
Qs
G Quantity supplied in the public sector
Qs
I Quantity supplied in the informal sector
Qs





P Demand for skilled labor in the urban private formal sector
SAVA Saving by rural sector household
SAVE Saving by proﬁt earners and capitalists
SAVF Saving by urban formal sector household
SAVI Saving by informal sector household
srateA Saving rate of rural household
srateE Saving rate of proﬁt earners and capitalists
srateF Saving rate of formal sector household
srateI Saving rate of informal sector household
SKL Flow of newly-skilled workers
SP Skilled labor employed in private urban formal
TRH Total government transfers
TXREV Tax revenues
UA Unskilled labor employed in rural sector
UI Unskilled labor employed in informal sector
UP Unskilled labor employed in private urban formal sector
URUR Supply of unskilled labor in rural sector
Us
URB Urban unskilled labor supply
Ud
A Demand for labor in the rural sector
Ud
I Demand for labor in the informal sector
Ud
P Demand for labor in the urban formal private sector
Us
F Supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector
Us
I Supply of labor in the informal sector
Us
RUR Labor supply in rural sector
Us
URB Urban unskilled labor supply
UNEMPU Unskilled unemployment rate, urban formal sector
UNEMPS Skilled unemployment rate
VA Value added in rural sector
VI Value added in informal sector
VG Value added in public sector
83VP Value added in private urban formal sector
WA Nominal wage in rural sector
WI Nominal wage in informal sector
WS Nominal wage rate for skilled labor, private formal sector
WSG Nominal wage rate for skilled labor, public sector
wSG Real wage rate for skilled labor, public sector
WSP Skilled wage rate in the private formal sector
WUG Nominal wage rate for unskilled labor, public sector
wUG Real wage rate for unskilled labor, public sector
WUP Nominal wage for urban unskilled labor, private formal sector
WTA Total wealth of rural sector household
WTE Total wealth of proﬁt earners and capitalists
WTF Total wealth of urban formal sector household
WTI Total wealth of informal sector household
xih Subsistence level of consumption of good i by household h
XA Production of rural sector good
XG Production of public good
XI Production of informal sector good
XP Production of private formal urban sector good
YF P Income by private formal urban sector ﬁrm
YH A Income of rural sector household
YH E Income of proﬁt earners and capitalists
YH F Income of formal sector household
YH I Income of informal sector household
ZG Investment demand for rural sector good
ZP Investment demand for private urban formal sector good
Zd
P Desired level of investment
ZG
P Private investment by urban formal sector ﬁrms allocated to
purchases of public services
ZP
P Private investment by urban formal sector ﬁrms allocated to
purchases of private goods
84Exogenous Variables
Name Deﬁnition
CONTAG Change in “sentiment” on world capital markets
ER Nominal exchange rate
FINFL Foreign inﬂation
FLG Foreign borrowing by government
FLP Foreign borrowing by private formal urban ﬁrms
ftaxP Corporate income tax rate
gRUR Population growth in rural economy
gURB Population growth in urban economy
ID Interest rate on domestic deposits
IDF Domestic interest rate on foreign-currency deposits held
in the domestic banking system
IEDU Investment in education
IFW Interest rate paid on foreign loans
IFW
G Interest rate on government foreign loans
IFW
RF Risk-free foreign interest rate on FDW
h
IINF Investment in infrastructure
ILF Interest rate on foreign-currency loans by domestic banks
inctaxh Income tax rate for households h
paytaxS Payroll tax rate on skilled labor
paytaxU Payroll tax rate on unskilled labor
protaxi Tax rate on gross production
REMIT Foreign-currency value of remittances from abroad
SG,SE
G Skilled workers in public production, and public education
ST
G Total number of skilled workers in the public sector
saltaxi Tax rate on domestic sales
sstaxS Social security tax on skilled workers in private formal sector
sstaxU Social security tax on unskilled workers in private formal sector
tmA,tm P Import tariﬀ on rural sector goods, private urban sector goods
UG Unskilled workers in public sector
WF Foreign wage measured in foreign-currency terms
WM Nominal wage rate for unskilled labor, private formal sector
wpei World price of exports of good i,w i t hi = A,P
wpmi World price of imports of good i,w i t hi = A,P
85Parameters
Name Deﬁnition
aij Input-output coeﬃcient for i = A,G,I,P and j = A,G,I,P
α0 Parameter used in determining subjective probability of default
αEDA Shift parameter in XA equation
αEDP Shift parameter in XP equation
αQA Shift parameter in rural sector composite good
αQP Shift parameter in urban composite good
αXA Shift parameter in rural sector production
αXG Shift parameter in public production
αXGJ Shift parameter in JG equation
αXI Shift parameter in informal sector production
αXP Shift parameter in private formal urban sector production
αXP1 Shift parameter in composite input of unskilled
and skilled/capital composite input
αXP2 Shift parameter in composite input of skilled
w o r k e r sa n dp r i v a t ec a p i t a l
βE Share parameter in SKL equation
βEDA Share parameter in XA equation
βEDP Share parameter in XP equation
βF Speed of adjustment for the supply of unskilled labor in the
formal urban private sector
βQA Shift parameter in rural sector composite good
βQP Shift parameter in private formal urban sector composite good
βXA Shift parameter in rural sector production
βXGJ Share parameter in JG equation
βXG Share parameter in VG equation
βXI Share parameter, informal production
βXP Share parameter between inputs and public capital
in private production
βXP1 Share parameter between unskilled
and skilled/capital composite input
βXP2 Share parameter between skilled workers
and private capital
ccih Coeﬃcients determining allocation of total consumption
by household h to good i
86δc Collateral parameter
δEDU Depreciation rate of education capital
δIMIG Rate of “attrition” of the stock of migrants
δINF Depreciation rate of infrastructure capital
δP Depreciation rate of private capital
δS Rate of depreciation of the skilled labor force
ηXA Coeﬃcient of returns to scale in rural production
γBh S h a r eo fd o m e s t i cd e p o s i t si nt o t a ld e p o s i t sf o rh o u s e h o l dh
γE Share of transfers allocated to proﬁt earners and capitalists
γA Share of transfers allocated to rural sector household
γF Share of transfers allocated to formal sector household
γI Share of transfers allocated to informal sector household
ggA Share of public expenditure on rural good
ggG Share of public expenditure on public good
ggP Share of public expenditure on formal private urban good
κB
DL Parameter used in determining the lending rate
κERP Parameter used in determining external risk premium
κh
FD Measure of relative weight of the domestic interest rate
on foreign-currency deposits held at home for household h
κREM Share of wages being remitted
λIM Speed of adjustment rate on international migration
λM Speed of adjustment rate on migration
λPINV Partial adjustment parameter for actual investment
Ωj0 Shift parameters in reservation wages of skilled and
unskilled workers, j = S,U
φ
P
DL Parameter used in determining the composition of
the demand for loans
φ
B




GB Parameter used in determining additional demand for
government bonds by commercial banks (ratio of net wealth)
φ
B,p
GB Share of direct bond placement with commercial banks
φ
i
S Parameters used in reservation wages of skilled workers
for i =1 ,2,3
φ
i
U Parameters used in reservation wages of unskilled workers
for i =1 ,2,3,4
87ρE Substitution parameter in SKL equation
ρEDA Substitution parameter in XA equation
ρEDP Substitution parameter in XP equation
ρQA Substitution parameter in rural composite good
ρQP Substitution parameter in urban composite good
ρXA Substitution parameter in rural sector production
ρXG Substitution parameter in VG equation
ρXGJ Substitution parameter in JG equation
ρXP Substitution parameter between inputs and
public capital in private production
ρXP1 Substitution parameter between unskilled and
skilled/capital composite input
ρXP2 Substitution parameter between skilled workers
and private capital
rreq Reserve requirement ratio
σACC Elasticity of investment to growth rate of GDP at factor cost
σEDA Elasticity parameter used in EA equation
σEDP Elasticity parameter used in EP equation
σF Parameter used in supply of unskilled labor in formal sector
σIL Elasticity parameter used in equation determining desired
level of investment, Zd
P
σIM Elasticity of international migration to wage diﬀerentials
σKINF Elasticity of investment to ratio of public infrastructure capital
to total urban population
σM Elasticity of migration to wage diﬀerentials
σQA Elasticity of rural composite good
σQP Elasticity of private formal urban composite good
σh
SAV Parameter in the saving rate equation for household h
σXP1 Elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers
and composite input of skilled workers and private capital
σXP2 Elasticity of substitution between skilled workers
and private capital
sh
0 Saving coeﬃcient for household h
shpA Share of proﬁts from rural production distributed to
rural household
shpE
B Share of commercial banks’ income received by proﬁte a r n e r s
proﬁte a r n e r s
88shpG Share of the central bank’s proﬁts transferred to
the government
shpF
P Share of private formal sector ﬁrms’ net income
distributed to formal sector household
shpE
P Share of private formal sector ﬁrms’ net income
received by proﬁte a r n e r s
θU Share of urban unskilled workers employed in formal sector
θ
h




DD Parameter used in determining the equilibrium condition of
the market for government bonds
θ
h




















GB Parameter used in determining additional demand for
government bonds by commercial banks (ratio of net wealth)
θ
E
GB Parameter used in determining the equilibrium condition of
the market for government bonds
θ
h
IF Parameter used in Hd
h equation
τI Fraction of remittances allocated to informal households
νS,νU Firms’ bargaining power relative to skilled, unskilled, workers
wri Initial share of good i in rural consumption price index
wui Initial share of good i in urban consumption price index
wcp Share of spending by rural households in total consumption
χ Parameter used in determining expected nominal depreciation
zzG Share of investment expenditure on public goods
zzP Share of investment expenditure on formal private goods
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Calibration and Parameter Values
The calibration of our IMMPA model for Turkey was carried out using
a) a 1996 Financial Social Accounting Matrix (FSAM); b) an auxiliary data
set; and c) a set of non-calibrated parameters. A summary description of
each of these sources of information is provided in this appendix. A complete
description of the creation of the 1996 Turkey FSAM and the auxiliary data
set, as well as the derivation of non-calibrated parameter estimates, can be
found in Jensen and Yeldan (2004).
The main data sources for the creation of the FSAM include the website
of the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO), http://www.dpt.gov.tr,
and various publications by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and the
Central Bank of Turkey (CBT). The FSAM itself was built in two steps:
a) construction of a MacroSAM; and b) disaggregation into a MicroSAM.
The construction of the MacroSAM was split into a real MacroSAM and a
ﬁnancial MacroSAM. The link between the two types of MacroSAMs was
made through the savings-investment balance account. Accordingly, this
account was forced to be identical in the two SAMs. In the following, the
construction and key characteristics of the real and ﬁnancial MacroSAMs
are described. The more disaggregated characteristics are presented in the
publication mentioned above.
The real MacroSAM was built around ﬁnal demand and cost components
of GDP data from the SIS. SIS publications were generally preferred as the
main data source for the input-output part of the MacroSAM, because they
allowed for better correspondence with other data sources. Intermediate con-
sumption, however, was derived from the 1996 Turkey Input-Output table.
SPO data were used as the main source for public sector budget data,
whereas the CBT publications were used as the main source for the current
account of the balance of payments. Data regarding commercial banks and
the Central Bank of Turkey were mainly obtained from the SIS publications.
The balanced real MacroSAM is presented in Table C1.
The real MacroSAM indicates that foreign trade (as measured by the sum
of exports and imports) makes up around 50 percent of GDP, implying that
Turkey is a fairly open economy. Exports make up around 13 percent of total
production, while imports make up around 13 percent of absorption. The
large current account deﬁcit, which amounts in the MacroSAM to about 5
90percent of GDP, indicates that absorption is signiﬁcantly larger than produc-
tion. Accordingly, the trade balance deﬁcit amounts to more than 20 percent
of export earnings.
Looking at savings rates, the data show that ﬁrms save around 20 percent
of their disposable income whereas households save around 14 percent of their
disposable income. In comparison, the government primary surplus amounts
to 3.4 percent of GDP. Finally, it can be noticed that interest payments by
the public sector amount to around 39 percent of tax revenues, indicating
that the public sector is running an unsustainable overall budget deﬁcit of
6.9 percent of GDP.
The ﬁnancial MacroSAM was built around the savings and investment ag-
gregates from the real MacroSAM. Accordingly, the correspondence between
the savings-investment balance accounts of the two SAMs were ensured by
construction. The main data sources used in the construction of the ﬁnancial
MacroSAM, as noted earlier, were CBT and SIS publications. SIS publica-
tions were used to obtain information about public sector ﬁnancial ﬂows as
well as private sector borrowing in foreign currency. The remaining data in
the ﬁnancial MacroSAM were derived from CBT publications. The balanced
ﬁnancial MacroSAM is presented in Table C2.
The ﬁnancial MacroSAM shows that government bond issuing was around
7.1 percent of GDP. This is slightly higher than the overall ﬁnancing need of
6.9 percent, reﬂecting the fact that the Turkish government reduced foreign
borrowing slightly in 1996. The increase in bond holdings of commercial
banks accounts for around 90 percent of the total increase in government
bonds. Proﬁt earners and the CBT hold the remaining 10 percent of newly
issued bonds. Money issuing, including lending to commercial banks, stood
at 2.4 percent of GDP. This is a relatively small number, but it reﬂects the
fact that inﬂation was high in 1996. Money issuing would therefore represent
a substantially higher proportion of lagged GDP, reﬂecting signiﬁcant use of
the inﬂation tax in 1996. Foreign exchange reserves increased by around 6.1
percent of imports. Again, the current import number is inﬂated by strong
depreciation of the exchange rate in 1996. The change in foreign exchange
reserves would therefore be signiﬁcant when compared to lagged imports,
indicating that signiﬁcant exchange reserve accumulation took place in 1996.
Households increased borrowing from commercial banks by around 2.9 per-
cent of GDP or 25 percent of household savings. In comparison, ﬁrms in-
creased their borrowing by around 9.3 percent of GDP or 95 percent of ﬁrms’
savings. This pattern indicates that commercial banks mainly invest their
91funds in a)l o a n st oﬁrms for investment purposes; and b) government bonds.
Finally, it may be noticed that commercial banks mainly funds themselves
out of domestic deposits. The share of deposits in total additional funding
was around 65 percent in 1996.
The auxiliary data set includes mainly level data and interest rates that
could not be directly derived from the 1996 Turkey FSAM. The Turkish
economy was characterized by much instability over the 1996-2003 period.
The base year of 1996 was a relatively normal year, but it was still charac-
terized by very high inﬂation and underlying volatility. Accordingly, it does
not make much sense to use 1995-96 ﬁnancial stock data to derive implicit
interest rates, or to use 1995-96 interest rates to derive implicit data on ﬁ-
nancial stocks. Instead, initial and lagged values for interest rates, inﬂation
rates and depreciation rates were chosen (in close correspondence with coun-
try experts) so as to match 2003 values and to give rise to reasonable stock
numbers. In sum, auxiliary data on ﬁnancial stocks were derived by applying
the chosen interest rates to the interest payments recorded in the FSAM.
The auxiliary data for the labor market indicate that unskilled labor is
overwhelmingly employed in the rural and informal sectors. Speciﬁcally, 49
percent of the unskilled employed workers are working in the rural sector
while 39 percent are working in the urban informal sector. In comparison,
11 percent of unskilled employed are working in the urban private formal
sector while only 1 percent is initially employed in the public sector. Skilled
employment is more of an urban public sector phenomenon. Indeed, the
data indicate that 62 percent of employed skilled workers are working in the
urban private formal sector whereas 38 percent of the total are working in
the urban public sector. Initial rates of open unemployment among workers
in the urban formal sector can be derived from estimates of sectoral labor
supply. Initial unemployment rates are estimated to be 11 percent among
unskilled workers and 15 percent among skilled workers.
Initial levels of the private formal sector capital stock, as well as public
capital stocks of infrastructure and education capital, were derived from a
combination of initial data and sensitivity analyses. Depreciation rates were
estimated to be 2.1 percent for public sector infrastructure capital and 3.4
percent for public sector education capital and private formal sector capital.
Growth rates of rural and urban labor stocks were estimated to be respec-
tively 0.1 percent and 2.3 percent. The reason why the rural labor supply
growth rate is so low is because of the relatively high level of migration of
families from rural to urban areas. While fertility levels remain relatively
92high in rural compared to urban areas, migration of families bring children
into urban areas before they reach the age for entering the labor market.
The relatively high levels of migration between segments of the Turkish
labor market is evident from the data as well. Estimates indicate that yearly
migration from rural to urban areas amounts to around 2.5 percent of the
rural labor force. In comparison, overseas migration amounts to around 1.5
percent of the urban labor force, while migration between the informal and
formal labor market segments amounts to around 0.9 percent of the informal
sector labor force. Accordingly, migration plays a very important role for
labor market developments in Turkey. In addition, the yearly number of
unskilled workers receiving education to achieve skilled status, is estimated
to be around 1.7 percent of the urban labor force.
The initial inﬂa t i o nr a t ew a ss e ta ta r o u n d3 0p e r c e n tw h i l et h ei n i t i a l
depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate was set at around 10 percent.
The initial expected depreciation rate was also set at 10 percent. In addition,
the levels of bond holdings of proﬁt earners, commercial banks, and the CBT,
were set so as to imply an initial bond rate of about 16 percent (consistent
with the interest payments on government bonds given in the FSAM). The
initial bond rate was allowed to be relatively low so as to achieve a sensible
balance between the ﬁnancial stocks and ﬂows. Accordingly, these initial
levels allowed for a public debt stock of around 66 percent of GDP. Never-
theless, inﬂation and exchange rate depreciation were allowed to increase to
levels around 30-40 percent (and the bond rate around 45-50 percent) as part
of the baserun solution underlying the simulations reported in this paper. In
addition, the level of household deposits with commercial banks, as well as
commercial bank borrowing from the CBT, were set so as to allow for a de-
posit rate/oﬃcial rate of 25 percent and a foreign-currency deposit rate of
about 10 percent. In addition, the stock of money holdings by households
were set so as to allow for a reserve requirement ratio of around 5 percent.
Levels of household and ﬁrm loan stocks with commercial banks were
subsequently set so as to allow for a lending rate around 35 percent. Given
the levels of domestic deposit rates and expected depreciation, as well as the
reserve requirement ratio and the lending rate, a domestic premium of about
3 percent was derived. Again, the initial level of the domestic premium was
set at a relatively low level in order to allow for a sensible balance between
ﬁnancial stocks and ﬂows. Nevertheless, the domestic premium was allowed
to increase to levels of 5-8 percent as part of the baserun solution underlying
the simulations reported in the text.
93The probability of default was initially set at 50 percent, but was allowed
to decline to levels around 30-40 percent over the baserun. The mirror image
of the decline in the probability of default was that credibility was allowed
to increase from an initial level of 50 percent to around 60-70 percent over
the baserun period. This also meant that expected inﬂation was allowed to
decline slightly from an initial level of about 18 percent over the baserun. The
expected depreciation rate was subsequently allowed to increase gradually
from an initial level of around 10 percent (as noted above) to levels slightly
below expected inﬂation over the baserun. Foreign inﬂation was set at an
exogenous rate of 2 percent per year.
Most of the non-calibrated parameters were estimated from time-series
data. The relative wage elasticity of rural-urban migration was estimated
to be 0.019 whereas the relative wage elasticity of overseas migration was
estimated to be 0.012. The partial adjustment (weighting) parameters were
estimated to be respectively 0.56 and 0.28. Subsequently, the wage elasticity
and partial adjustment speed of informal-formal sector migration were set at
intermediate levels of 0.016 and 0.40. The rate of decline in the number of
Turkish workers abroad was set at 1 percent per year, whereas the share of
remittances in foreign workers’ wage income was set at 10 percent. In addi-
tion, the substitution elasticity between teachers and education capital in the
CES skills upgrading function (that is, the education production function)
w a ss e ta tal o wv a l u eo f0 . 3 .
In the money demand speciﬁcation, the domestic currency interest rate
elasticity was set at the commonly estimated value of -0.21 for all households,
except for proﬁt earners where the elasticity was set at the estimated value of
-0.91. The foreign currency interest rate elasticity was set at the commonly
estimated value of -0.63. Finally, the disposable income elasticity of money
demand was set at the commonly estimated value of 0.42 for all households.
In the demand equation for foreign currency deposits, the foreign cur-
rency interest rate elasticity was set at the commonly estimated value of 0.37
for the formal sector household and proﬁt earners (the only two categories
of households in the model in possession of foreign exchange deposits). In
the demand equation for government bonds by proﬁt earners, the foreign
currency interest rate elasticity was set at the estimated value of -0.37, and
the domestic currency interest rate elasticity at the estimated value of -0.91
(similar to the money demand elasticity given earlier). In addition, the bond
rate elasticity was set at a level of 2.0, above the estimated level of 1.20, at
the suggestion of country experts.
94Turning to the private wage speciﬁcations, parameters measuring worker’s
bargaining strength were set at the same estimated level of 0.63. The public
sector wage “leadership” elasticities were set at estimated levels of respec-
tively 0.75 and 0.06 for the unskilled and skilled wage speciﬁcations; the
expected urban price elasticities were set at estimated levels of respectively
0.32 and 0.26 for the unskilled and skilled wage speciﬁcations; and the unem-
ployment elasticities were set at estimated levels of respectively 0.23 and 0.25
for the unskilled and skilled wage speciﬁcations. Finally, the minimum wage
elasticity was set at an estimated level of 0.47 for the unskilled wage speciﬁ-
cation. The plausibility of parameter values was assessed through sensitivity
analysis.
Production elasticities were not immediately available but we relied to
some extent on existing CGE applications for Turkey. The share of land in
rural production was assumed to be 0.3, leaving a production share of 0.7 for
unskilled labor (assuming that no capital is used in agricultural production).
Similarly, it was assumed that there are moderate substitution possibilities
between public sector infrastructure investment and unskilled rural labor,
through the adoption of an elasticity of substitution of 0.75. Finally, the
elasticity of transformation between domestic market and export of domestic
production was taken to be at a middle level, that is, 1.0. In addition, it was
assumed as a starting point that there are constant returns to scale in urban
informal sector production.
Looking at urban private formal production, the top-level CES substitu-
tion elasticity between public infrastructure capital and composite primary
production factors was assumed to be a moderate 0.75. At the second level,
CES substitution possibilities between formal urban unskilled labor and the
composite factor consisting of skilled labor and private physical capital was
assumed to be higher at 1.2. Finally, the bottom-nest CES substitution elas-
ticity between skilled labor and the private capital stock was assumed to
be 0.4, reﬂecting little substitution possibilities at this level (as suggested
by the evidence). Finally, public sector composite labor was assumed to
be moderately substitutable to public infrastructure capital in the top-level
public production nest, whereas substitution possibilities between unskilled
and skilled public employees was assumed to be moderately high at 1.2.
Parameter estimates for the private investment equation were taken in
part from the studies cited in the text. The elasticity with respect to real
GDP growth (which captures the accelerator eﬀect) was set at 1.5 and the
real lending rate elasticity was set at the relatively high value of -2.5. How-
95ever, for the infrastructure elasticity of investment demand, we found no
reliable estimate in the literature. We chose to set it to a relatively low
value, 0.1. Given that we did not consider changes in public investment in
infrastructure, this particular choice has actually little eﬀect on the simula-
tion results reported in the text. The partial adjustment rate of actual to
desired investment was set at an estimated value of 0.63.
The relative interest rate elasticity of commercial banks’ foreign borrow-
ing was set at an estimated value of 0.46, whereas the elasticity of commercial
banks’ demand for government bonds with respect to the expected bond rate
was set at the estimated value of 0.46. The elasticity of the banks’ domestic
risk premium with respect to the collateral ratio could not be estimated due
to a lack of time series data. The elasticity was chosen to be 0.2, in order
to avoid very large (and potentially destabilizing) ampliﬁcation eﬀects. Sim-
ilarly, the partial adjustment coeﬃcient of the expected rate of depreciation
was chosen to be 0.9 at the suggestion of country experts. Finally, the direct
placement ratio of government bonds with commercial banks was set at 0.9,
reﬂecting the placement ratio of newly issued bonds observed in the 1996
Turkey FSAM.
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102Table 1
Financial Balance Sheets
(in domestic-currency terms, at current prices)
Households
Assets Liabilities
Cash holdings (H) Borrowing from Banks (DLF)
Dom. bank dep. (DD +ER· FD) Net ﬁnancial wealth (WT)




Private capital Stock (PK· KP) Dom. borr. (DLP + ER· DLFP)





B) Dom. bank dep. (DD + ER· FD)
Loans to ﬁrms (DLP + ER· DLFP) Foreign borrowing (ER· FL B)
L o a n st oh o u s e h o l d s( DLF) Borr. from central bank (DLB)
Reserve requirements (RR)N e t w o r t h ( NWB)
Central Bank
Assets Liabilities
Loans to commercial banks (DLB) Cash in circulation (H)
Foreign reserves (ER· FF) Reserve requirements (RR)
Government bonds (GBCB)N e t w o r t h ( NWCB)
Government
Assets Liabilities
Education Capital (PK· KEDU) Government bonds (GB)




Loans to commercial banks (DLBC) Cash in circulation (H)
Foreign reserves (ER· FF) Reserve requirements (RR)
Education capital (PK· KEDU) Government bonds (GB)




Total resources -3.51 -6.06 -7.57 -8.67 -9.43 -9.56 -8.85 -7.58 -6.44 -5.94
    Gross domestic product -3.48 -5.85 -7.33 -8.47 -9.28 -9.42 -8.71 -7.45 -6.33 -5.88
    Imports of goods and NFS -3.61 -6.74 -8.41 -9.36 -9.95 -10.01 -9.31 -8.02 -6.76 -6.12
Total expenditure -3.51 -6.06 -7.57 -8.67 -9.43 -9.56 -8.85 -7.58 -6.44 -5.94
Total consumption -3.46 -5.25 -6.39 -7.40 -8.15 -8.24 -7.49 -6.29 -5.30 -4.99
    Private consumption -3.46 -5.24 -6.34 -7.32 -8.04 -8.12 -7.37 -6.18 -5.19 -4.87
    Public consumption -3.44 -5.35 -6.67 -7.87 -8.76 -8.91 -8.13 -6.85 -5.80 -5.50
Total investment -4.08 -9.44 -12.06 -13.15 -13.68 -13.65 -12.73 -11.10 -9.51 -8.70
    Private investment -4.29 -10.89 -14.32 -15.61 -16.18 -16.17 -15.25 -13.52 -11.81 -10.99
    Public investment -3.46 -6.03 -7.57 -8.66 -9.37 -9.45 -8.68 -7.33 -6.08 -5.49
Exports of goods and NFS -3.15 -5.64 -7.73 -9.27 -10.23 -10.50 -9.92 -8.64 -7.24 -6.35
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 0.00
    Exports of goods and NFS 0.10 0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.26 -0.29 -0.32 -0.32 -0.24 -0.13
    Imports of goods and NFS -0.04 -0.28 -0.34 -0.29 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.08
    Labor Remittances 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02
    Factor services 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
Capital account -0.15 -0.35 -0.24 -0.09 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.00
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Commercial bank borrowing  -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07
    Public borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Household deposits abroad 0.08 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 -0.06
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.35 0.23 0.27 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.21
    Direct taxes 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.51 0.53 0.46 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.25
    Indirect taxes -0.01 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04
Total expenditure 0.70 0.99 1.40 1.82 2.07 2.02 1.71 1.35 1.14 1.14
    Consumption 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08
    Investment 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04
    Transfers to households -1.17 -2.32 -3.72 -4.81 -5.24 -4.97 -4.25 -3.44 -2.84 -2.56
    Domestic interest payments 1.86 3.27 5.06 6.56 7.24 6.92 5.87 4.68 3.86 3.58
    Foreign interest payments 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Total financing 0.35 0.76 1.13 1.45 1.65 1.66 1.47 1.20 1.00 0.94
    Foreign borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Bond financing 0.35 0.76 1.13 1.45 1.65 1.66 1.47 1.20 1.00 0.94
Labor Market
Nominal wages
    Rural sector -3.45 -5.23 -6.52 -7.76 -8.72 -8.93 -8.24 -7.06 -6.10 -5.79
    Informal sector -3.37 -3.88 -4.78 -6.18 -7.39 -7.60 -6.69 -5.40 -4.78 -5.24
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled -3.55 -6.84 -8.57 -9.56 -10.12 -10.10 -9.25 -7.78 -6.39 -5.68
        Skilled  -3.15 -6.40 -8.16 -9.14 -9.71 -9.79 -9.14 -7.82 -6.41 -5.54
    Public sector
        Unskilled -3.45 -5.62 -7.02 -8.17 -9.00 -9.12 -8.34 -7.03 -5.91 -5.50
        Skilled  -3.45 -5.62 -7.02 -8.17 -9.00 -9.12 -8.34 -7.03 -5.91 -5.50
Employment
    Rural sector 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.35
    Informal sector 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 -0.17 -0.22 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled 0.05 -0.08 -0.36 -0.40 -0.34 -0.41 -0.59 -0.73 -0.68 -0.50
        Skilled  -0.17 -0.25 -0.40 -0.49 -0.54 -0.58 -0.62 -0.66 -0.71 -0.78
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
        Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply (urban formal)
    Unskilled 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 -0.19 -0.26 -0.33 -0.39 -0.45 -0.49
    Skilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate 
1
    Unskilled -0.04 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.12 -0.03
    Skilled  0.09 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
Real wage ratios 
1
   Expected urban-rural 0.00 -0.13 -2.55 -3.02 -2.46 -1.81 -1.46 -1.28 -0.92 -0.31
   Expected formal-informal 0.00 -0.47 -8.07 -9.16 -7.57 -5.83 -5.28 -5.63 -5.47 -3.80
   Expected international-urban 0.00 0.52 1.97 1.71 0.84 0.20 -0.20 -0.45 -0.53 -0.35
Migration 
1
    Rural-urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
    Formal-informal (% of urban formal unskilled labor supply) 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
    International-Urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial Sector
    Deposit rate 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
    Deposit rate (Foreign Currency) -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07
    Lending rate 4.79 4.74 4.70 4.64 4.57 4.50 4.47 4.48 4.52 4.57
    Lending rate (Foreign Currency) 4.18 4.28 4.34 4.33 4.25 4.12 3.95 3.76 3.61 3.54
    Bond rate 6.17 7.65 9.48 10.71 11.07 10.60 9.47 8.06 6.88 6.29
    Credibility 0.00 -0.81 -1.87 -2.67 -3.16 -3.41 -3.39 -3.07 -2.54 -2.07
    Domestic premium 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08
    External premium -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07
    Probability of default 0.00 0.81 1.87 2.67 3.16 3.41 3.39 3.07 2.54 2.07
Memorandum items
GDP at market prices
 2 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29
Value added at factor cos
 2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.19 -0.22 -0.23 -0.24
   Value added in rural secto
 2 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18
   Value added in urban informal secto
 2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
   Value added in urban formal secto
 2 -0.02 -0.06 -0.18 -0.28 -0.36 -0.45 -0.56 -0.66 -0.73 -0.78
Private Consumption
2 -0.01 0.36 0.66 0.86 0.97 1.01 0.96 0.83 0.69 0.58
Private Investment
 2 -0.85 -4.78 -6.78 -7.16 -7.15 -7.11 -6.88 -6.41 -5.94 -5.82
Disposable income
 2 0.99 1.59 1.91 2.16 2.33 2.31 2.09 1.81 1.65 1.71
Nominal exchange rate
 1 -3.30 -5.98 -7.80 -9.04 -9.80 -9.91 -9.19 -7.81 -6.41 -5.59
real exchange rate
 1 0.22 0.33 0.02 -0.24 -0.36 -0.44 -0.49 -0.45 -0.31 -0.13
Inflation rate
 1 -3.78 -2.48 -1.76 -1.60 -1.25 -0.20 1.23 2.04 1.67 0.57
Ratio of debt to GDP 1.23 2.66 3.96 5.07 5.79 5.82 5.16 4.22 3.50 3.28
Ratio of tax revenues to government domestic deb
 1 -2.92 -4.21 -4.44 -4.54 -4.71 -4.86 -4.76 -4.32 -3.73 -3.35
Ratio of foreign currency deposits in total bank deposit
1 -0.52 -0.57 -0.60 -0.59 -0.56 -0.50 -0.44 -0.38 -0.33 -0.32
Ratio of foreign currency loans in total bank loan
 1 -1.34 -1.36 -1.05 -0.23 0.79 1.54 1.71 1.39 0.93 0.59
Ratio of government primary surplus to GDP 1.50 2.51 3.93 5.11 5.59 5.26 4.40 3.48 2.86 2.64
Ratio of Interest payments to tax revenue 6.47 12.32 19.84 25.69 27.84 26.12 21.80 17.03 13.63 12.19
1 Absolute deviations from baseline.  
2 In real terms.
Table 2
Permanent, 5 Percentage Point Increase in the Official Interest Rate
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods
Turkey: Simulation Results123456789 1 0
Consumer Prices and the Real Exchange Rate 
1
Rural CPI -3.44 -5.37 -6.68 -7.87 -8.77 -8.91 -8.14 -6.85 -5.81 -5.50
Urban CPI -3.45 -5.62 -7.02 -8.17 -9.00 -9.12 -8.34 -7.03 -5.91 -5.50
Real exchange rate 0.22 0.33 0.02 -0.24 -0.36 -0.44 -0.49 -0.45 -0.31 -0.13
Value Added Prices 
1
Rural -3.45 -5.23 -6.50 -7.71 -8.63 -8.81 -8.10 -6.90 -5.92 -5.60
Urban private informal -3.37 -3.89 -4.81 -6.26 -7.51 -7.76 -6.88 -5.61 -5.00 -5.46
Urban private formal -3.50 -6.85 -8.71 -9.65 -10.11 -10.06 -9.27 -7.83 -6.35 -5.46
Urban public -3.45 -5.62 -7.02 -8.17 -9.00 -9.12 -8.34 -7.03 -5.91 -5.50
Real Disposable Income 
1
Rural households 0.31 0.70 1.40 1.91 2.12 2.07 1.88 1.65 1.47 1.40
Urban households -0.12 0.29 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.61 0.45 0.30
    Informal 0.35 1.70 2.16 1.97 1.61 1.45 1.50 1.45 1.04 0.35
    Formal -1.34 -3.95 -7.49 -10.66 -12.10 -11.50 -9.64 -7.57 -6.00 -5.17
    Capitalists and rentiers 0.84 3.03 5.72 8.23 9.84 10.15 9.17 7.61 6.39 5.99
Real Private Consumption 
1
Rural households 1.38 2.23 2.82 3.15 3.20 2.98 2.58 2.19 1.99 2.03
Urban households 0.84 1.47 1.73 1.93 2.07 2.08 1.90 1.64 1.44 1.40
    Informal 0.73 2.20 2.63 2.39 1.99 1.79 1.79 1.70 1.29 0.62
    Formal -0.93 -3.38 -6.98 -10.23 -11.72 -11.18 -9.39 -7.39 -5.82 -4.95
    Capitalists and rentiers 3.11 5.71 8.38 10.79 12.30 12.46 11.28 9.54 8.28 7.98
Production Structure
Size of informal sector (% of total output) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Size of rural sector (% of total output) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
Composition of Employment
Employment in rural sector (% of total employment) 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16
Employment in informal sector (% of total employment) 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
Employment in informal sector (% of urban employment) 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Employment in public sector (% of total employment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Employment in public sector (% of urban employment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Private Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.01 0.45 0.76 0.90 0.98 1.02 1.02 0.95 0.82 0.71
Consumption (% of total consumption) 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10
Investment (% of GDP) -0.16 -0.84 -1.04 -1.03 -1.00 -1.00 -0.98 -0.92 -0.83 -0.76
Investment (% of total investment) -0.16 -1.12 -1.71 -1.83 -1.83 -1.83 -1.78 -1.66 -1.52 -1.46
Public Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08
Investment (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04
    Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public sector wage bill (% of public expenditure) 0.70 1.69 3.52 5.62 6.65 6.10 4.79 3.61 2.86 2.56
External Sector
Rural sector exports (% of total exports) 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08
Imports of non-rural sector goods (% of total imports) -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
External debt (% of GDP) -0.13 -0.51 -0.76 -0.84 -0.83 -0.77 -0.67 -0.57 -0.49 -0.46
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.06 -0.22 -0.45 -0.50 -0.47 -0.48 -0.52 -0.50 -0.38 -0.21
1 Percentage deviations from baseline.
Table 3
Permanent, 5 Percentage Point Increase in the Official Interest Rate
(Absolute deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods
Turkey: Prices and Structural Indicators123456789 1 0
Real Sector
Total resources 2.49 5.76 8.81 11.65 13.95 15.04 14.68 13.52 12.68 12.89
    Gross domestic product 3.19 6.43 9.51 12.46 14.84 15.96 15.59 14.45 13.65 13.92
    Imports of goods and NFS 0.25 3.49 6.40 8.90 10.93 11.94 11.63 10.47 9.53 9.58
Total expenditure 2.49 5.76 8.81 11.65 13.95 15.04 14.68 13.52 12.68 12.89
Total consumption 3.90 6.97 9.80 12.62 14.92 15.97 15.64 14.66 14.11 14.60
    Private consumption 3.93 6.98 9.77 12.54 14.80 15.83 15.49 14.53 13.98 14.44
    Public consumption 3.69 6.93 10.00 13.11 15.64 16.79 16.40 15.32 14.74 15.29
Total investment 0.74 4.97 8.63 11.53 13.77 14.79 14.14 12.42 11.00 10.90
    Private investment -0.11 4.33 8.19 11.06 13.24 14.18 13.30 11.18 9.31 8.86
    Public investment 3.21 6.46 9.53 12.37 14.68 15.81 15.49 14.35 13.52 13.75
Exports of goods and NFS 0.35 2.93 5.83 8.52 10.77 12.03 11.88 10.73 9.59 9.33
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account -0.01 -0.19 -0.15 -0.06 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.04
    Exports of goods and NFS -0.80 -0.92 -0.88 -0.88 -0.87 -0.82 -0.78 -0.80 -0.90 -1.03
    Imports of goods and NFS -0.89 -0.83 -0.83 -0.92 -1.00 -1.03 -1.03 -1.06 -1.12 -1.19
    Labor Remittances -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21
    Factor services 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09
Capital account 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.04
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Commercial bank borrowing  0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02
    Public borrowing -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
    Household deposits abroad -0.01 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.04
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 1.58 1.38 1.19 0.99 0.90 0.96 1.09 1.18 1.19 1.14
    Direct taxes -0.60 -0.71 -0.83 -0.97 -1.04 -1.00 -0.91 -0.84 -0.83 -0.86
    Indirect taxes 2.18 2.09 2.02 1.96 1.94 1.96 2.00 2.02 2.01 2.00
Total expenditure 1.27 0.63 -0.06 -0.75 -1.20 -1.25 -1.01 -0.72 -0.60 -0.70
    Consumption 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.21
    Investment 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
    Transfers to households 1.69 2.23 3.09 3.99 4.54 4.57 4.22 3.75 3.43 3.38
    Domestic interest payments -0.43 -1.61 -3.17 -4.77 -5.77 -5.87 -5.28 -4.53 -4.11 -4.20
    Foreign interest payments -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
Total financing -0.31 -0.75 -1.25 -1.74 -2.10 -2.21 -2.10 -1.90 -1.79 -1.85
    Foreign borrowing -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
    Bond financing -0.30 -0.74 -1.24 -1.74 -2.09 -2.20 -2.08 -1.89 -1.78 -1.83
Labor Market
Nominal wages
    Rural sector 3.32 6.26 8.94 11.61 13.69 14.44 13.78 12.50 11.67 11.90
    Informal sector 5.14 8.58 12.03 16.20 19.73 21.40 21.26 20.72 21.22 23.24
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled -1.35 2.06 5.23 8.00 10.27 11.45 11.21 10.10 9.25 9.47
        Skilled  -2.46 0.16 2.61 4.71 6.52 7.61 7.54 6.58 5.70 5.72
    Public sector
        Unskilled 3.49 6.74 9.81 12.82 15.28 16.41 16.05 14.94 14.25 14.68
        Skilled  3.49 6.74 9.81 12.82 15.28 16.41 16.05 14.94 14.25 14.68
Employment
    Rural sector 0.00 0.13 0.30 0.48 0.64 0.80 0.93 1.05 1.15 1.23
    Informal sector 0.00 -0.16 -0.37 -0.59 -0.80 -0.99 -1.15 -1.29 -1.40 -1.49
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled -2.12 -2.72 -3.18 -3.66 -3.97 -4.01 -3.90 -3.85 -4.00 -4.28
        Skilled  -0.29 -0.23 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.17 -0.23
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
        Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply (urban formal)
    Unskilled 0.00 -0.10 -0.26 -0.45 -0.67 -0.90 -1.14 -1.36 -1.58 -1.80
    Skilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate 
1
    Unskilled 1.75 2.05 2.18 2.29 2.28 2.07 1.78 1.55 1.46 1.47
    Skilled  0.16 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07
Real wage ratios 
1
   Expected urban-rural 0.00 -10.67 -8.42 -6.60 -5.84 -5.21 -4.39 -3.64 -3.24 -3.10
   Expected formal-informal 0.00 -26.74 -21.70 -18.81 -19.59 -20.62 -20.62 -20.38 -21.39 -24.03
   Expected international-urban 0.00 8.07 7.07 6.13 5.37 4.66 4.06 3.57 3.01 2.20
Migration 
1
    Rural-urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04
    Formal-informal (% of urban formal unskilled labor supply) 0.00 -0.10 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21
    International-Urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
Financial Sector
    Deposit rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Deposit rate (Foreign Currency) 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02
    Lending rate 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.29
    Lending rate (Foreign Currency) 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.26 0.47 0.66 0.80
    Bond rate -0.75 -2.94 -4.99 -6.89 -8.10 -8.42 -7.90 -7.02 -6.39 -6.39
    Credibility 0.00 1.94 3.09 4.21 5.11 5.71 5.90 5.68 5.23 4.89
    Domestic premium 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.33
    External premium 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
    Probability of default 0.00 -1.94 -3.09 -4.21 -5.11 -5.71 -5.90 -5.68 -5.23 -4.89
Memorandum items
GDP at market prices
 2 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25
Value added at factor cos
 2 -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.22
   Value added in rural secto
 2 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.64
   Value added in urban informal secto
 2 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 -0.30 -0.31
   Value added in urban formal secto
 2 -0.34 -0.46 -0.53 -0.60 -0.65 -0.66 -0.66 -0.68 -0.73 -0.82
Private Consumption
 2 0.40 0.22 -0.02 -0.21 -0.34 -0.40 -0.35 -0.21 -0.07 0.02
Private Investment
 2 -2.97 -1.77 -0.99 -0.80 -0.80 -0.96 -1.48 -2.33 -3.15 -3.61
Disposable income
 2 0.29 -0.20 -0.58 -0.93 -1.16 -1.16 -0.95 -0.69 -0.59 -0.71
Nominal exchange rate
 1 0.71 3.64 6.63 9.33 11.56 12.75 12.53 11.38 10.37 10.34
real exchange rate
 1 -0.50 -0.79 -0.75 -0.68 -0.58 -0.42 -0.29 -0.27 -0.37 -0.52
Inflation rate
 1 3.88 3.56 3.48 3.55 2.97 1.40 -0.46 -1.36 -0.82 0.55
Ratio of debt to GDP -1.05 -2.59 -4.35 -6.07 -7.32 -7.70 -7.30 -6.61 -6.22 -6.41
Ratio of tax revenues to government domestic deb
 1 7.71 8.04 8.37 8.93 9.77 10.58 10.99 10.91 10.67 10.72
Ratio of foreign currency deposits in total bank deposit
1 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.16 -0.28 -0.38 -0.46 -0.50
Ratio of foreign currency loans in total bank loan
 1 -0.64 -1.74 -3.52 -5.84 -8.19 -9.82 -10.48 -10.53 -10.53 -10.90
Ratio of government primary surplus to GDP -0.13 -0.86 -1.91 -3.02 -3.67 -3.66 -3.18 -2.63 -2.32 -2.35
Ratio of Interest payments to tax revenue -3.03 -8.02 -14.73 -21.05 -24.52 -24.33 -21.53 -18.26 -16.24 -16.13
1 Absolute deviations from baseline.  
2 In real terms.
Table 4
Permanent, 2.5 Percentage Point Increase in the Value Added Tax Rate
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods
Turkey: Simulation Results123456789 1 0
Consumer Prices and the Real Exchange Rate 
1
Rural CPI 3.67 6.92 10.00 13.12 15.65 16.80 16.40 15.32 14.73 15.27
Urban CPI 3.49 6.74 9.81 12.82 15.28 16.41 16.05 14.94 14.25 14.68
Real exchange rate -0.50 -0.79 -0.75 -0.68 -0.58 -0.42 -0.29 -0.27 -0.37 -0.52
Value Added Prices 
1
Rural 3.32 6.35 9.14 11.93 14.13 14.99 14.40 13.18 12.41 12.69
Urban private informal 5.14 8.45 11.71 15.66 18.99 20.46 20.17 19.51 19.89 21.80
Urban private formal  -2.82 0.13 2.89 5.22 7.18 8.31 8.18 7.16 6.24 6.28
Urban public 3.49 6.74 9.81 12.82 15.28 16.41 16.05 14.94 14.25 14.68
Real Disposable Income 
1
Rural households -0.59 -0.61 -0.94 -1.33 -1.64 -1.83 -1.93 -1.96 -1.99 -2.06
Urban households 0.76 0.52 0.29 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.61 0.77
    Informal 1.37 1.39 1.53 2.20 2.81 3.06 3.15 3.48 4.24 5.28
    Formal 0.91 2.16 4.38 6.77 8.24 8.25 7.20 5.88 4.92 4.65
    Capitalists and rentiers -0.41 -2.89 -5.75 -8.64 -10.61 -11.18 -10.51 -9.39 -8.74 -8.97
Real Private Consumption 
1
Rural households -0.59 -0.92 -1.25 -1.54 -1.73 -1.74 -1.61 -1.47 -1.46 -1.63
Urban households 0.67 0.16 -0.22 -0.52 -0.69 -0.63 -0.36 -0.03 0.20 0.23
    Informal 1.37 1.32 1.46 2.15 2.79 3.08 3.22 3.59 4.36 5.38
    Formal 0.91 2.02 4.23 6.66 8.19 8.30 7.38 6.16 5.22 4.89
    Capitalists and rentiers -0.41 -3.11 -5.97 -8.79 -10.67 -11.11 -10.27 -9.02 -8.33 -8.64
Production Structure
Size of informal sector (% of total output) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Size of rural sector (% of total output) 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18
Composition of Employment
Employment in rural sector (% of total employment) 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.63
Employment in informal sector (% of total employment) 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.18 -0.22 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28
Employment in informal sector (% of urban employment) 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Employment in public sector (% of total employment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Employment in public sector (% of urban employment) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Private Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.48 0.35 0.17 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.19 0.30
Consumption (% of total consumption) 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
Investment (% of GDP) -0.61 -0.31 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.21 -0.27 -0.40 -0.54 -0.63
Investment (% of total investment) -0.62 -0.43 -0.27 -0.27 -0.29 -0.33 -0.45 -0.67 -0.91 -1.07
Public Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.21
Investment (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
    Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public sector wage bill (% of public expenditure) -0.94 -1.35 -2.23 -3.29 -3.94 -3.90 -3.44 -2.93 -2.61 -2.56
External Sector
Rural sector exports (% of total exports) -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
Imports of non-rural sector goods (% of total imports) -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13
External debt (% of GDP) -0.26 -0.08 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.00 -0.15 -0.32 -0.47 -0.55
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) -1.69 -1.75 -1.72 -1.80 -1.87 -1.85 -1.81 -1.86 -2.02 -2.21
1 Percentage deviations from baseline.
Table 5
Permanent, 2.5 Percentage Point Increase in the Value Added Tax Rate
(Absolute deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods
Turkey: Prices and Structural Indicators123456789 1 0
Real Sector
Total resources 0.78 1.69 2.28 2.64 2.74 2.45 1.78 0.96 0.35 0.11
    Gross domestic product 0.94 1.84 2.43 2.81 2.92 2.62 1.93 1.11 0.49 0.25
    Imports of goods and NFS 0.27 1.19 1.78 2.07 2.13 1.87 1.26 0.48 -0.12 -0.35
Total expenditure 0.78 1.69 2.28 2.64 2.74 2.45 1.78 0.96 0.35 0.11
Total consumption 1.27 2.08 2.55 2.88 2.97 2.65 1.97 1.19 0.63 0.43
    Private consumption 1.22 2.03 2.50 2.82 2.89 2.57 1.89 1.12 0.57 0.36
    Public consumption 1.57 2.39 2.91 3.30 3.43 3.10 2.36 1.51 0.92 0.71
Total investment 0.17 1.45 2.29 2.59 2.57 2.19 1.39 0.42 -0.32 -0.57
    Private investment -0.02 1.39 2.35 2.62 2.53 2.08 1.19 0.10 -0.74 -1.04
    Public investment 0.73 1.60 2.18 2.53 2.64 2.37 1.72 0.92 0.31 0.08
Exports of goods and NFS 0.07 0.76 1.43 1.87 2.10 1.98 1.47 0.72 0.06 -0.25
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account -0.07 -0.14 -0.12 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01
    Exports of goods and NFS -0.25 -0.30 -0.26 -0.23 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13
    Imports of goods and NFS -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
    Labor Remittances -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
    Factor services 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Capital account 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Commercial bank borrowing  0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
    Public borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Household deposits abroad -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.89 0.95 1.03 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.23
    Direct taxes 1.01 1.06 1.14 1.19 1.23 1.25 1.27 1.29 1.30 1.33
    Indirect taxes -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
Total expenditure 0.80 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.73 0.88 1.03 1.13 1.19
    Consumption 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
    Investment -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
    Transfers to households 0.70 0.82 1.05 1.27 1.34 1.22 0.99 0.75 0.59 0.53
    Domestic interest payments 0.06 -0.13 -0.39 -0.65 -0.73 -0.53 -0.15 0.24 0.50 0.61
    Foreign interest payments -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Total financing -0.09 -0.22 -0.34 -0.43 -0.46 -0.41 -0.29 -0.17 -0.07 -0.04
    Foreign borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Bond financing -0.09 -0.22 -0.34 -0.43 -0.46 -0.41 -0.29 -0.16 -0.07 -0.04
Labor Market
Nominal wages
    Rural sector 1.42 2.21 2.66 2.98 3.04 2.67 1.92 1.08 0.48 0.26
    Informal sector 3.78 4.39 4.72 5.24 5.48 5.07 4.17 3.27 2.75 2.66
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled 0.16 1.12 1.78 2.13 2.25 2.02 1.40 0.61 0.02 -0.18
        Skilled  -0.14 0.62 1.17 1.43 1.52 1.36 0.87 0.17 -0.41 -0.63
    Public sector
        Unskilled 1.22 2.08 2.63 3.01 3.13 2.82 2.11 1.28 0.68 0.46
        Skilled  1.22 2.08 2.63 3.01 3.13 2.82 2.11 1.28 0.68 0.46
Employment
    Rural sector 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23
    Informal sector 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.08
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled -0.46 -0.62 -0.67 -0.74 -0.76 -0.69 -0.58 -0.51 -0.51 -0.55
        Skilled  -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
        Skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply (urban formal)
    Unskilled 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.19 -0.27 -0.34 -0.41 -0.47 -0.53 -0.57
    Skilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate 
1
    Unskilled 0.38 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.33 0.22 0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06
    Skilled  0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Real wage ratios 
1
   Expected urban-rural 0.00 -2.70 -2.01 -1.36 -1.13 -0.93 -0.63 -0.33 -0.18 -0.12
   Expected formal-informal 0.00 -12.90 -9.44 -7.12 -6.80 -6.65 -6.04 -5.29 -4.99 -5.23
   Expected international-urban 0.00 0.65 0.19 -0.14 -0.29 -0.40 -0.50 -0.58 -0.70 -0.90
Migration 
1
    Rural-urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
    Formal-informal (% of urban formal unskilled labor supply) 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
    International-Urban (% of urban unskilled labor supply) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Financial Sector
    Deposit rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Deposit rate (Foreign Currency) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
    Lending rate 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.06
    Lending rate (Foreign Currency) 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.28
    Bond rate 0.59 0.34 0.08 -0.18 -0.22 0.06 0.59 1.17 1.59 1.76
    Credibility 0.00 0.90 1.41 1.87 2.15 2.23 2.11 1.84 1.52 1.30
    Domestic premium 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
    External premium 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
    Probability of default 0.00 -0.90 -1.41 -1.87 -2.15 -2.23 -2.11 -1.84 -1.52 -1.30
Memorandum items
GDP at market prices
 2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Value added at factor cos
 2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
   Value added in rural secto
 2 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
   Value added in urban informal secto
 2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
   Value added in urban formal secto
 2 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
Private Consumption
 2 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.17 -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02
Private Investment
 2 -0.30 0.23 0.57 0.51 0.32 0.11 -0.16 -0.48 -0.72 -0.79
Disposable income
 2 -0.36 -0.49 -0.56 -0.62 -0.64 -0.58 -0.46 -0.34 -0.28 -0.30
Nominal exchange rate
 1 0.23 1.03 1.67 2.06 2.21 2.03 1.46 0.69 0.06 -0.20
real exchange rate
 1 -0.31 -0.40 -0.35 -0.27 -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.05
Inflation rate
 1 1.43 0.95 0.64 0.48 0.16 -0.43 -1.01 -1.17 -0.84 -0.30
Ratio of debt to GDP -0.32 -0.77 -1.19 -1.50 -1.61 -1.43 -1.02 -0.57 -0.25 -0.13
Ratio of tax revenues to government domestic deb
 1 3.45 3.49 3.49 3.49 3.50 3.43 3.21 2.87 2.57 2.44
Ratio of foreign currency deposits in total bank deposit
1 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.29 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34
Ratio of foreign currency loans in total bank loan
 1 -0.25 -0.56 -1.00 -1.51 -1.96 -2.12 -1.96 -1.61 -1.27 -1.03
Ratio of government primary surplus to GDP 0.16 0.10 -0.05 -0.22 -0.26 -0.12 0.15 0.40 0.58 0.65
Ratio of Interest payments to tax revenue -0.66 -2.01 -3.95 -5.65 -6.10 -5.14 -3.38 -1.69 -0.62 -0.28
1 Absolute deviations from baseline.  
2 In real terms.
Table 6
Permanent, 5 Percentage Point Increase in Income Tax Rate on Profit Earners
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods
Turkey: Simulation Results123456789 1 0
Consumer Prices and the Real Exchange Rate 
1
Rural CPI 1.53 2.38 2.90 3.30 3.43 3.10 2.35 1.51 0.91 0.69
Urban CPI 1.22 2.08 2.63 3.01 3.13 2.82 2.11 1.28 0.68 0.46
Real exchange rate -0.31 -0.40 -0.35 -0.27 -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.05
Value Added Prices 
1
Rural 1.42 2.23 2.70 3.05 3.13 2.78 2.03 1.20 0.61 0.39
Urban private informal 3.78 4.37 4.68 5.19 5.42 5.03 4.14 3.26 2.78 2.72
Urban private formal  -0.17 0.67 1.29 1.58 1.67 1.49 0.96 0.23 -0.36 -0.58
Urban public 1.22 2.08 2.63 3.01 3.13 2.82 2.11 1.28 0.68 0.46
Real Disposable Income 
1
Rural households -0.22 -0.19 -0.27 -0.37 -0.43 -0.43 -0.39 -0.34 -0.29 -0.25
Urban households 0.16 0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.11
    Informal 2.01 1.82 1.67 1.80 1.92 1.88 1.77 1.74 1.85 2.00
    Formal 0.89 1.27 1.98 2.66 2.92 2.66 2.10 1.53 1.15 1.02
    Capitalists and rentiers -3.87 -4.32 -4.81 -5.32 -5.52 -5.27 -4.63 -3.91 -3.41 -3.22
Real Private Consumption 
1
Rural households -0.22 -0.31 -0.35 -0.38 -0.37 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07
Urban households -0.15 -0.34 -0.45 -0.50 -0.51 -0.44 -0.31 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09
    Informal 2.01 1.80 1.65 1.80 1.93 1.91 1.81 1.80 1.90 2.04
    Formal 0.89 1.21 1.95 2.66 2.95 2.73 2.20 1.66 1.27 1.11
    Capitalists and rentiers -3.87 -4.40 -4.86 -5.32 -5.48 -5.17 -4.47 -3.72 -3.23 -3.08
Production Structure
Size of informal sector (% of total output) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Size of Rural sector (% of total output) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Composition of Employment
Employment in rural sector (% of total employment) 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Employment in informal sector (% of total employment) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Employment in informal sector (% of urban employment) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Employment in public sector (% of total employment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Employment in public sector (% of urban employment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Private Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.07
Consumption (% of total consumption) -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Investment (% of GDP) -0.18 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18
Investment (% of total investment) -0.14 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25 -0.28
Public Expenditures
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
Investment (% of GDP) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
    Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public sector wage bill (% of public expenditure) -0.39 -0.52 -0.82 -1.17 -1.33 -1.21 -0.95 -0.71 -0.57 -0.53
External Sector
Rural exports (% of total exports) -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Imports of non-rural sector goods (% of total imports) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
External debt (% of GDP) -0.01 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.32
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) -0.46 -0.49 -0.44 -0.44 -0.42 -0.37 -0.31 -0.28 -0.30 -0.32
1 Percentage deviations from baseline.
Table 7
Permanent, 5 Percentage Point Increase in Income Tax Rate on Profit Earners
(Absolute deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
Periods















Commodities 11,752,353 10,543,236 1,170,126 2,893,335 796,975 3,182,305 30,338,330
  Labor Factor 4,993,374 296,717 5,290,091
  Capital Factor 7,734,324 599,936 287,550 8,621,809
Households 4,616,421 5,789,799 1,898,905 464,618 55,279 287,387 13,112,408
Domestic Banks 46,811 375,181 598,218 2,914 1,109,926 2,133,051
Central Bank 2,904 150,574 30,021 183,500
Government 749,586 951,298 673,670 864,225 301,420 94,032 180,586 3,814,817
  Private Investment 1,419,097 1,669,534 64,358 0 -997,648 737,995 2,893,335
  Public Investment 1,283,420 1,283,420
Rest of the World 4,110,584 173,507 72,853 168,314 4,525,258
Total Expenditures 25,276,448 30,338,330 5,290,091 8,621,809 13,112,408 2,133,051 183,500 3,814,817 2,893,335 1,283,420 4,525,258
Table C1. Real 1996 MacroSAM for Turkey (Billions of Turkish Lira)HOUSEHOLDS CAPITAL GOVERNMENT
DOMESTIC 
BANKS






HOUSEHOLDS 8,851 1,878,328 70,816 129,559 2,087,554
CAPITAL 2,893,335 2,893,335
GOVERNMENT 0
DOMESTIC BANKS 418,020 1,341,625 922,757 218,150 2,900,552
REST OF THE WORLD 132,613 -29,564 955,982 1,059,031
CENTRAL BANK 95,604 1,885 250,220 347,709
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 1,669,534 1,419,097 -997,648 64,358 737,995 2,893,335
TOTAL 2,087,554 2,893,335 0 2,900,552 1,059,031 347,709 2,893,335
Table C2. Financial 1996 MacroSAM for Turkey (Billions of Turkish Lira)Figure 1
Turkey: Macroeconomic Indicators, 1987-2003
(In percent per annum, unless otherwise indicated)
Source: International Monetary Fund and official estimates.
1/ Share of foreign currency deposits in total bank deposits.
2/ A rise is a depreciation.
































        Fiscal and current account balance (in % GDP)









Real effective exchange rate
(1990=100; right scale)
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         Exchange Rates and Inflation
Exchange rates 2/




Consolidated net debt of the 
public sector 
(in percent of GNP)
Nominal depreciation rate













25 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force, right scale)
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)








Unit wage costs (in US$, 1988Q1=100)




















Source: Central Bank of Turkey.Figure 3
Turkey: Saving and Interest Rates, 1992-2002
Source: IMF.















Private saving (in % of GDP) Real interest rate (deposit rate minus inflation rate,
right scale)Figure 4
Turkey: Investment, Growth, and Interest Rates, 1970-2000













Private investment (in % of GDP)
Public investment (in % of GDP)
Real GDP growth (in %)
Source: Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) and WDI.

















Private investment (in % of GDP)
Real interest rate (deposit rate minus inflation rate, right scale)Figure 5






















































































































































































































































Short-term credit rate Deposit rate

































































































































































































Money market rate Deposit rate 3-month repurchase rateFigure 6

















































































































































































































3-month deposit rate (before tax, left scale)
3-month deposit rate (after tax, left scale)
3-month deposit rate (after tax, in US dollars, right scale)
Source: IMF.
Note: Expected depreciation is the difference between 3 month time deposit rates after tax in Turkish Lira 















































































































































































































(difference between 3-month deposit rate 
in Turkish Liras and US dollars) Figure 7
Turkey: External Spreads, June 1999-June 2003
(in basis points)










JPM EMBI and composite - stripped spread (US$)
JPM EMBI and Turkey - stripped spread (US$)
Source: JP Morgan.Figure 8
Turkey: Bank Lending Spread and Cyclical Output, 1987-2002 
Source: International Monetary Fund and Central Bank of Turkey.











































































Lending rate minus deposit rate 
Cyclical component 
(right scale) 1/ 